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Condemnation Without Basis: An Expressive 
Failure of Corporate Prosecutions 
Gregory M. Gilchrist* 
This is the second of two Articles on the expressive aspects of corporate criminal 
liability. The first Article argued that to justify imposing criminal liability on 
corporations we must refer to the expressive function of criminal liability. This Article 
considers the expressive function of actual corporate prosecutions and identifies aspects 
of corporate prosecutions that generate expressive costs rather than benefits. These are 
the expressive failures of corporate prosecutions. This Article identifies a number of 
these failures and introduces a model of perceived legitimacy and the expressive 
function of punishment that explains how expressive failures harm the legal system. 
Mere respondeat superior liability—holding corporations criminally liable where there 
is no basis to condemn the corporation qua corporation—is the most significant 
expressive failure. It is also the easiest to fix: Allow corporations a good-faith defense 
against criminal liability. Good faith defenses have been proposed before, but this is the 
first proposal based on the expressive impact of the defense. A good faith defense will 
limit the application of corporate criminal liability to those instances where there is a 
basis to condemn the corporation as a whole, thus realigning the expression inherent in 
criminal punishment with commonly held views about blaming corporations. 
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The last decade has been a turbulent one for large corporations. In 
2002, Big Five accounting firm Arthur Anderson collapsed following its 
conviction for obstruction of justice.1 It was the era of the Enron, Tyco, 
Adelphia, and Worldcom scandals, to which Congress reacted with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), increasing accounting oversight and 
corporate reporting requirements.2 Nearly five years ago, we entered the 
global financial crisis.3 Lehman Brothers and Bear Sterns collapsed,4 AIG 
was rescued with $85 billion in credit from the Federal Reserve Bank,5 and 
the United States became the majority owner of General Motors,6 giving a 
literal truth to Charles Wilson’s famous quote.7 Congress reacted with the 
Dodd-Frank Act, increasing regulation of financial institutions.8 
Beyond SOX and Dodd-Frank, this span of ten years brought 
significant changes to the legal landscape confronting corporations. First, 
there has been a dramatic increase in enforcement of the Foreign 
 
 1. See Flynn McRoberts, The Fall of Andersen, Chi. Trib., Sept. 1, 2002, at 1.1 (“[Arthur 
Andersen’s] felony conviction for obstructing a federal investigation into Enron Corp., its now-
notorious client, cost Andersen the heart of its practice. It will continue with a tiny fraction of the 
85,000 employees it spread across the globe just months ago.”). 
 2. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley 
Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 91, 94–95 (2007) (noting that Congress 
responded by enacting SOX after fraudulent accounting practices were revealed at a number of major 
corporations). 
 3. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends 
to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1019, 1047 (2012) (“In 2008, 
Congress saw the nation’s largest financial institutions race like lemmings over the cliff and into 
insolvency.”). 
 4. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and 
Lehman 2000–2008, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 257, 262 (2010) (“Bear Stearns was forced to sell itself to 
JPMorgan in March 2008 for a per share price equal to about a quarter of the January 2000 stock 
price. Lehman filed for bankruptcy in September 2008.”). 
 5. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 943, 943–45 (2009) (“AIG 
was on the verge of bankruptcy and had to be rescued by the United States government through an 
$85 billion loan.”). 
 6. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 482 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[Pursuant to its deal 
with GM, the U.S. Department of] Treasury will own 60.8% of New GM’s common stock on an 
undiluted basis. It also will own $2.1 billion of New GM Series A Preferred Stock.”). 
 7. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 83rd Cong. 1 (1953) (statement of 
Charles E. Wilson, President, General Motors) (“I thought what was good for the country was good 
for General Motors and vice versa.”). 
 8. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1020 (“The Dodd-Frank Act, enacted in 2010, followed an even 
greater financial collapse [than that preceding the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley], one that threatened 
financial institutions on a global scale and brought the problem of systemic risk to the attention of a 
public already infuriated at financial institutions (and their highly compensated investment bankers) 
being bailed out at taxpayer expense.”). 
Gilchrist_21 (D. Barca) (Do Not Delete) 5/24/2013 4:41 PM 
1124 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1121 
 
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).9 As a result of aggressive enforcement 
and broad interpretation of jurisdictional requirements, nearly every 
corporation that conducts business across national lines has potential 
criminal exposure under the FCPA. And because the FCPA concerns even 
relatively insignificant conduct,10 there are seemingly endless sources of 
potential exposure for corporations. 
Second, the Department of Justice increasingly relies on deferred 
prosecutions agreements (“DPAs”) and non-prosecution agreements 
(“NPAs”) to resolve criminal investigations.11 This development provides a 
significant benefit to corporations that avoid being indicted and convicted, 
but it also effectively lowers the burden for prosecutors seeking to charge a 
corporation. Corporations have strong incentives to avoid indictment, 
and some may be willing to settle matters through DPAs and NPAs that 
they otherwise would have fought through trial. 
Finally, whistleblower protections provided by SOX12 and bounties 
provided by Dodd-Frank13 have increased corporate exposure to criminal 
liability by generating a significant new source of information—the 
corporate insider.14 
The full impact of these changes is not yet known. One obvious trend, 
however, is that corporations will spend more money on compliance, 
investigations, remedial actions and resolving prosecutions. While 
corporations ought to be subject to criminal prosecution, the current state 
 
 9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2011). See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the 
Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 Ind. L. Rev. 389, 389 (2010) (“[D]uring the past decade, 
enforcement agencies resurrected the FCPA from near legal extinction.”). 
 10. By its terms, the FCPA applies to “an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the 
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of 
value,” and does not contain a de minimis exception. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). The statute does exempt 
“reasonable and bona fide expenditure[s], such as travel and lodging expenses . . . directly related to—
(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution or 
performance of a contract.” Id. § 78dd-1(c)(2). However, the scope of this exception is unclear, and 
some companies have felt compelled to seek opinion releases from the Department of Justice before 
spending relatively modest amounts on travel and meals. See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Review: Opinion Procedure Release No. 07-01 (Dep’t of Justice July 24, 2007). 
 11. See Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 1417, 1432 (2009) (“Since the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002, the number of DPAs 
and NPAs has increased substantially . . . .”). 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). 
 13. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street 
by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 73, 74–75 (2012) (“In 
Dodd-Frank, however, whistleblowers not only receive protection from termination or adverse 
employment action but can also lay claim to financial bounties for bringing information to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that leads to successful securities enforcement actions.”). 
 14. “[S]ince the program was established in August 2011, about eight tips a day are flowing into 
the SEC.” SEC Issues First Whistleblower Program Award, SEC News Dig., Aug. 21, 2012, at 1. While 
the program is still young, as the SEC makes significant and well-publicized bounty payments, 
awareness of and trust in the program is likely to increase, which should in turn generate higher 
numbers of whistleblowers. 
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of criminal prosecutions is problematic. The breadth of substantive 
criminal laws, the extensiveness of prosecutorial discretion, the aversion to 
risk on the part of corporations, and the heightened incentives to report 
wrongdoing can result in seemingly arbitrary enforcement. 
Facing these developments, some have begun to call for changes to 
how and when corporations ought to be held criminally liable. The most 
prominent of these proposals is that corporations ought to be afforded a 
good faith defense to criminal liability. Presently, a corporation may be 
held criminally liable for any act of any corporate agent performed in the 
scope of agency and with the intent to benefit the corporation.15 A good 
faith defense would limit this near-strict-liability standard of respondeat 
superior. Academics have proposed the defense,16 practitioners have asked 
courts to adopt something like the defense,17 and lobbyists have urged 
Congress to enact the defense.18 The arguments offered in support of the 
good faith defense have generally concentrated on questions of fairness to 
the corporation, fairness to the law-abiding shareholders and employees of 
the corporation, or efficacy of deterrence. This Article presents a new 
rationale for the good faith defense: preserving the expressive efficacy of 
the criminal justice system and the legitimacy of the legal system. 
I have previously argued that the practice of holding corporations 
criminally liable can only be justified by reference to the expressive aspect 
of criminal sanctions.19 Deterrence is the primary goal of corporate 
criminal liability, but deterrence can generally be achieved as effectively 
 
 15. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909). 
 16. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith” Affirmative 
Defense, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1537 (2007) (presenting legal developments that further justify a good 
faith defense); see also Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 
2012 Wisc. L. Rev. 609, 612 (2012) (“[A]n FCPA compliance defense will better incentivize more 
robust corporate compliance, reduce improper conduct, and thus advance the FCPA’s objective of 
reducing bribery. An FCPA compliance defense will also increase public confidence in FCPA 
enforcement actions and allow the DOJ to better allocate its limited prosecutorial resources to cases 
involving corrupt business organizations and the individuals who actually engaged in the improper 
conduct.”); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to 
Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 605, 676 (1995) (“A 
corporation should be able to defend against vicarious criminal liability by showing that it had a clear 
and effective policy for complying with the law in place at the time of the violation, and that the 
employee’s acts violated that policy.”). 
 17. See Brief for the Ass’n of Corporate Counsel et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant 
Urging Reversal, United States v. Ionia Mgmt., 526 F. Supp. 2d 319 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-5081-CR) 
(urging the Second Circuit to limit the principle of respondeat superior in determining corporate 
criminal liability). 
 18. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 18–36 (2011) (statement of Michael 
B. Mukasey, former U.S. Attorney General, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP). 
 19. See generally Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 Hastings 
L.J. 1 (arguing that corporate criminal liability is best justified by reference to both deterrence and 
expressivism). 
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and less expensively by a regime of civil liability.20 Holding corporations 
criminally liable can deter, but it is no better than holding them civilly 
liable because, at least in theory, there is no criminal penalty that could 
not also be imposed civilly. The justification for corporate criminal 
liability is therefore found in its expressive benefits and in the expressive 
costs of not subjecting corporations to criminal liability. 
The problem is that corporate prosecutions often fail to serve a 
positive expressive function and sometimes serve a negative expressive 
function. As such, the practice of prosecuting corporations can undermine 
the expressive reason for allowing corporations to be prosecuted in the 
first place. In cases of what I call mere respondeat superior liability—
where there is no clear basis on which to condemn the corporation as a 
whole for the wrongdoing—the application of criminal law is at odds 
with widely held norms and results in a negative expression that is 
harmful to the legal system as a whole. 
This Article begins by identifying the value and potential costs of 
expressivism. While the expressive aspect of punishment serves various 
functions in a legal system, it can also undermine the perceived 
legitimacy of a legal system. This relationship between legal expression 
and perceived legitimacy is too often overlooked. Part I of this Article 
identifies relationships between expression, perceived legitimacy, and the 
acceptance of an obligation to obey the law by those subject to the law 
(the internal view). It concludes that expressivism is causally related to 
the perception of legitimacy and the internal view of law: This relation 
makes positive expression—and the avoidance of negative expression—
important for the stability of the system. Whether the expression is 
positive or negative depends on normative factors that influence how 
legal expression is generated and understood. Certain procedural norms 
are particularly important in this regard, and Part I concludes by 
exploring those procedural norms. 
Having identified the instrumental value of expressivism and 
developed a basic understanding of how legal actions are expressively 
understood, this Article turns to specific examples of corporate criminal 
prosecutions. Part II presents two different corporate prosecutions and 
identifies the expressive failures in each. The first, a case in which the 
corporation was convicted after trial, demonstrates the expressive failure 
of prosecuting corporations based on nothing more than respondeat 
superior liability. The second, a civil resolution to a criminal investigation, 
suffers from the same defect and also demonstrates other procedural 
expressive failures. Part II concludes by assessing the relative impact of 
negative expressions and by arguing that one negative expression in 
 
 20. Id. at 31–40. 
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particular—mere respondeat superior liability—is the most detrimental 
and the most easily remedied. 
Part III briefly answers the well-founded, but ultimately misplaced, 
objection that too few people are aware of specific legal actions like the 
prosecution of a corporation for the expression to have a meaningful 
impact. 
Finally, Part IV reviews the viability of concrete proposals to fix the 
respondeat superior standard of corporate liability, argues that a good 
faith defense is tenable, and explores the impact such a defense would 
have on corporate prosecutions and the expressive function of criminal 
liability. This Article concludes that a good faith defense to corporate 
criminal liability, while not devoid of problems, would remedy some 
expressive failures associated with corporate prosecutions to the benefit 
of the perception of legitimacy. 
Corporations obviously dominate markets, but they also increasingly 
dominate various parts of our legal system.21 For this reason, it is 
particularly important that the legal governance of corporations not be 
burdened with an expressive flaw. This Article suggests a path toward 
expressive clarity in prosecuting corporations. 
I.  The Functional Significance of Expression 
Criminal law is distinctively expressive. Violations of criminal law 
result not only in hard treatment—prison, a fine, probation, et cetera—but 
also reprobation. A person found to have violated a criminal law is subject 
to a degree, and possibly a kind, of condemnation not present with civil 
liability or regulatory infractions. This reprobation or condemnation that 
accompanies punishment is the expressive aspect of criminal law (or at 
least the dominant one). 
The expressive function of the criminal law is entrenched but not 
necessary. Indeed, as the distinction between criminal and civil laws 
becomes less clear, the unique expressive aspect of the criminal law may 
erode, and this would be a loss for the legal system. Expressivism in 
criminal law has many benefits: It serves to reify societal norms, and it can 
be used to shift societal norms. Additionally, expressivism serves as a tool 
of punishment: A penalty of some identified hard treatment is generally 
less severe than the same penalty accompanied by an expression of 
condemnation. 
The expressive aspect of criminal law also informs people’s 
perception of legitimacy. People make judgments about a legal system’s 
 
 21. See Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users, 53 Buff. 
L. Rev. 1369, 1398–404 (2006) (demonstrating the increased presence and influence of corporations in 
the economy and the increasing role of corporations in the legal system). 
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legitimacy based on what they perceive to be the expression inherent in 
various legal actions. Perceived legitimacy matters, because when people 
believe a legal system to be legitimate, they accept an obligation to comply 
with the requirements of the legal system, and the system is accordingly 
more stable and more efficient than it would be were it to rely on force 
alone. How people perceive the expression in various legal actions, 
however, depends on the norms of the perceiver. If we want to understand 
the expressions people are likely to perceive in corporate prosecutions, 
we need to know more about the norms that tend to inform judgments 
about legal actions. 
This Part first describes the relationship between expression, the 
perceived legitimacy of a legal system, and the acceptance of an 
obligation to comply with the law. It then identifies a set of norms that—
while not universal—are widely shared and helpful in assessing how 
people are likely to perceive modern corporate prosecutions. 
A. Expression, the Internal View, and Perceived Legitimacy 
1. The Internal View Distinguishes Law from Mere Power 
There is a difference between the law and the bare assertion of 
power. It is the difference between a gunman ordering a person to hand 
over her purse under threat of death, and a legal system ordering a 
person to pay taxes under threat of prison. This insight is the starting 
point for H.L.A. Hart’s inquiry into the concept of law.22 
Hart defines the internal view as the acceptance of an obligation to 
comply with authority for reasons other than fear of consequences for 
failure to do so or mere habit.23 The fact that people subject to the law 
adopt an internal view distinguishes the law from mere power.24 One 
might impose rules on others and generate compliance through force and 
threat of force alone; however, unless some people subject to the rules 
adopt an internal view toward the rules, the assertion of power cannot be 
considered law.25 The distinction is important because law has more 
stability than the bare assertion of power.26 People will (sometimes) obey 
 
 22. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 6–7 (2d ed. 1994). 
 23. Id. at 56–57. 
 24. Id. at 202–03. 
 25. Id. at 203. 
 26. Hart’s inquiry into the concept of law should not be mistaken as a mere exercise in definition 
or labeling. One could disagree that the assertion of power, where no one subject to that assertion 
adopted an internal view, is not law. One might conclude that law includes even the mere assertion of 
power. That conclusion strikes me as relatively inconsequential. It would still remain the case that 
there is a meaningful difference between a command with which people comply only for fear of 
consequences and a command with which people comply, at least in part, because they accept an 
obligation to comply. This distinction seems like as good a place as any, and probably better than 
others, to draw the line between law and not-law. But the label is not the point, the distinction is. 
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laws even where there is no consequence for the failure to do so. Mere 
power does not induce the same sort of obligation as law.27 
Of course, not all people subject to the law need to adopt the 
internal view. Indeed, it will rarely, if ever, be the case that all people 
subject to rules adopt an internal view of those rules.28 Some people will 
disagree with the rules and the authority of the system to impose rules. 
Others will perceive rules as inapplicable to themselves. Still others will 
give no thought to a possible duty to follow the rules other than 
recognizing the consequences of violating the rules and being detected. 
The fact that not all people subject to a legal system adopt the internal 
view does not render the legal system something less than law. Every 
system will have dissenters and contrarians. The requirement is not that 
every person subject to the rules adopt an internal view; it is that some 
people subject to the rules adopt an internal view.29 
The stability of the legal system is directly related to how many 
people adopt the internal view. A system in which very few people adopt 
the internal view will be less stable than one in which all people adopt 
the internal view because accepting an obligation to comply with the law 
generates its own reason to comply with the law apart from fear of 
sanctions.30 The dichotomy between law and mere force is a spectrum. 
On one end of the spectrum, Hart’s threatening gunman asserts more 
power. On the other end of the spectrum, the rules governing a small 
village, where all the villagers accept an independent obligation to 
comply with those rules, are law. Most legal systems will be somewhere 
between these extremes, but the less a legal system is reliant on force and 
the more it is supported by the internal view, the more efficient and 
stable that system will be. The internal view promotes stability because 
the accepted obligation to comply with the law is contrary to rebellion 
against or disregard of the law. It enhances efficiency because the law can 
rely, to some degree, on the accepted obligation to maintain compliance 
rather than enforcement. A well-functioning legal system will cause 
people to adopt the internal view.31 
 
 27. See Hart, supra 22, at 82–83 (considering the example of a gunman, A, ordering another 
person, B, to hand over money by threatening to shoot B if he does not comply, and concluding that it 
would be misleading to say “B ‘had an obligation’ or a ‘duty’ to hand over the money”). 
 28. Id. at 201. 
 29. See id. at 202–03. 
 30. See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 64 (2006) (“According to the Chicago study, 
those who feel that they ‘ought’ to follow the dictates of authorities are more likely to do so.”). For 
more on Tyler’s Chicago Study, see infra text accompanying notes 93–108. 
 31. As Hart described it: 
If the system is fair and caters genuinely for the vital interests of all those from whom it 
demands obedience, it may gain and retain the allegiance of most for most of the time, and 
will accordingly be stable. On the other hand, it may be a narrow and exclusive system run 
in the interests of the dominant group, and it may be made continually more repressive and 
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2. The Internal View Can Be Caused by the Perception of 
Legitimacy 
Perceived legitimacy causes the internal view. By legitimacy, I mean 
the fact that the legal system has a moral right to govern as it does. 
People who perceive the legal system to be legitimate will adopt an 
internal view toward the law because to believe a legal system has a 
moral right to govern as it does is to accept an obligation to comply with 
the requirements of that legal system. 
All legal systems purport to be legitimate.32 Laws restrict the liberty 
of the governed. Absent law, a person could kill, steal, or keep the fruits 
of her labor without systemic interference; law limits these freedoms 
systematically.33 By purporting to be legitimate, law seeks to distinguish 
its authority from the mere assertion of power. 
From a positivist perspective, a law may be evil and still be law.34 
There are, however, no legal systems that govern by purporting to be 
evil. A gang conceivably might do that (although I am unaware of any 
that do), and law-abiding members of society might say the gang was 
using force, or coercion, or intimidation to maintain compliance with its 
commands; but they would not call the gang’s power “law.”35 Legal 
systems, whether good, or evil, or somewhere in between, will purport to 
be legitimate. Plainly, therefore, purporting to be legitimate is different 
than being legitimate. 
The perception of legitimacy is also different than actual legitimacy. 
Just as a legal system purporting to be legitimate bears no necessary 
relation to its actual legitimacy, so too a person believing a law is 
legitimate bears no necessary relation to its actual legitimacy. This 
distinction between ways “legitimacy” is used is important. As Larry 
Solum has warned: “[O]ne should be very wary about deploying the idea 
of legitimacy. Because legitimacy has different senses and is 
 
unstable with the latent threat of upheaval. Between these two extremes various 
combinations of these attitudes toward law are to be found, often in the same individual. 
See Hart, supra 22, at 202. 
 32. See Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and 
Practical Reasoning 4 (2009) (“[G]iven that legal institutions purport to impose and enforce duties 
on people, given that they take it upon themselves to deprive those who disregard their legally 
imposed standards of property and liberty (and sometimes of their life), it follows that those 
institutions take themselves to be legitimate, that is to have the moral right to act as they do (and that 
individuals who occupy positions of power and responsibility within legal institutions believe, or make 
it appear that they believe, that they do have such rights).”). 
 33. Of course, absent other law, other, less systematic forces could also limit these freedoms, the 
most notable being the freedom of everyone else to kill, steal, or keep the fruits of their labor. 
 34. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 35. See Hart, supra note 22, at 82–83 (describing Hart’s example of a gunman demanding money 
under threat of violence). 
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undertheorized, it is very easy to make claims about legitimacy that are 
ambiguous or theoretically unsound.”36 
Solum differentiates normative legitimacy (“making assertions about 
some aspect of the rightness or wrongness of some action or institution”)37 
from sociological legitimacy (descriptive statements about the beliefs 
people have about the legitimacy of an action or institution).38 The 
question of normative legitimacy turns on whether a legal system has a 
moral right to govern as it does. This Article does not address normative 
legitimacy. 
I take as a given that the relation between law and morality is 
contingent, not necessary39 (that is, law can be understood without 
reference to morality40). This positivist view is most prominently associated 
with Kelson,41 Hart,42 and Raz,43 each of whom has written extensively on 
the distinction between law and morality. This is not to say that morality 
is not important to the positivist; morality is the primary basis on which 
to form judgments about legal systems and laws.44 However, morality is 
not a necessary element of law. A law can be immoral and nonetheless 
be law, and a legal system can be evil and nonetheless be a legal system.45 
Brian Leiter has labeled this effort to distinguish between law and 
morality the “Demarcation Problem,” presenting a fascinating argument 
that the problem is unlikely to be solved and any solution would not 
matter much anyway.46 
 
 36. See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Legitimacy, Legal Theory Blog (July 22, 
2007, 5:31 PM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2007/07/legal-theory--4.html; see also Josh Bowers 
& Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of 
Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 211, 213 (2012) (“[L]egitimacy is a term 
invoked so casually that it sometimes seems to signify little more than a vague aspiration.”). 
 37. Solum, supra note 36. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Raz, supra note 32, at 1 (“Theories of law tend to divide into those which think that, by its 
very nature, the law successfully reconciles the duality of morality and power, and those which think 
that its success in doing so is contingent . . . .”). Raz captures positivism as the view that “the content 
of the law can be established without resort to moral considerations bearing on the desirability or 
otherwise of any human conduct, or of having any particular legal standards.” Id. at 4. 
 40. Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in Natural Law Theory 158–60 
(Robert P. George ed., 1992) (“According to [the positivist conception of law], law can be understood 
in terms of rules or standards whose authority derives from their provenance in some human source, 
sociologically defined, and which can be identified as law in terms of that provenance. Thus statements 
about what the law is . . . can be made without exercising moral or other evaluative judgment.”). 
 41. See generally Hans Kelson, Pure Theory of Law (1970). 
 42. See generally Hart, supra note 22. 
 43. See generally Raz, supra note 32. 
 44. See id. at 1 (“I have suggested that it is essential to the law that it recognizes that its use of 
power is answerable to moral standards and claims to have reconciled power and morality. It may not 
live up to its own aspirations.”). 
 45. See id. at 4 (“[L]egal standards can fail to be morally sound, indeed they can be evil . . . .”). 
 46. See Brian Leiter, The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Skepticism, 
31 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 663, 664 (2011). The problem is unlikely to be solved, according to Leiter, 
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This Article avoids the demarcation problem altogether by not 
inquiring into the conditions necessary to be law; it instead inquires into 
the conditions under which law functions well. The answer to the 
function question is—in the abstract—fairly simple: Law functions better 
when more people subject to the law perceive it as legitimate. 
Accordingly, this Article relies on sociological legitimacy—or what I 
refer to as perceived legitimacy. Perceived legitimacy matters because if 
one perceives the legal system to be legitimate, one has reason to adopt 
the internal view (that is, one has reason to accept an obligation to comply 
with the commands of the legal system that she believes is legitimate). 
It is true that one might accept an obligation to comply with the law 
for reasons other than perceiving the legal system to be legitimate, but 
these other reasons are less sturdy than believing in the legitimacy of the 
legal system. For example, a person might accept such an obligation 
because she was raised to believe that she should do so and she never 
had occasion to question that belief.47 An obligation to comply premised 
on this sort of uninformed habit is weaker than an internal view 
predicated on a belief in the legitimacy of the legal system because it is 
unsupported by reason. Similarly, one might accept an obligation to 
comply with the law just because others appear to do so (that is, out of a 
desire to conform).48 Unlike an obligation stemming from mere habit, the 
obligation based on a desire to conform does provide a reason to maintain 
the internal view. Assuming most people (or the people the subject wishes 
to conform with) obey the law, then for a subject who desires to conform, 
this desire and the behavior of others generate a reason to obey the law. 
Indeed, conformity-based obligation is a powerful and important force in 
maintaining stability of legal systems. After all, most people most of the 
time probably do not reflect on the relative legitimacy of the legal system 
 
because “[a]rtefact concepts, even simple ones like ‘chair,’ are notoriously resistant to analyses in 
terms of their essential attributes.” Id. at 666–67. But even more interesting is the contention that we 
do not really care about the solution. Leiter notes that the practical reason to solve the demarcation 
problem is to determine what ought to be done in hard cases. Id. at 673. But solving the demarcation 
problem—whether from the perspective of positivism or from natural law—will not inform what ought 
to be done. Id. at 670. If moral validity is a necessary condition of law—the natural law view—and if 
moral obligation is not defeasible, then an immoral legal command is not law and need not be obeyed. 
Id. at 670–71. Likewise, however, if moral validity is not relevant to legal status—the positivist view—
and if moral obligation is not defeasible, then an immoral command is law and still need not be 
obeyed. Id. at 676. The defeasibility or indefeasibility of moral obligations is the issue we care about, 
and the resolution of the demarcation problem would not shed any light on that question. Id. at 675 
(“The idea that a putative solution to the Demarcation Problem gives us the answer [to the question of 
what ought to be done when the law and morality conflict] is an illusion.”). 
 47. See Hart, supra note 22, at 203 (“[T]heir allegiance to the system may be based on . . . an 
unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude . . . .”). 
 48. See id. (“[T]heir allegiance to the system may be based on . . . the mere wish to do as others 
do.”). 
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that governs them; laws may often be obeyed just because others are 
obeying the laws. 
The limitation of an obligation predicated on the desire to conform 
is that it is contingent on the circumstantial factor that others comply 
with the law. Whereas a belief in the legitimacy of the legal system gives 
a reason to comply with the law that is related to the substance of the 
law, the desire to conform gives a reason to comply that is entirely 
contingent on the behavior of others. 
To see why the perception of legitimacy is important to a well-
functioning legal system, at least over time, it is worth further examining 
the difference between an internal view based on a desire to conform and 
one based on the perception of legitimacy. Conformity might be 
understood as the day-to-day rationale for the internal view. Legitimacy, 
in turn, would be the deeper rationale that is less routinely consulted. As 
such, legitimacy is particularly important at the extremes and in the long 
term. In a new legal system, there is no history of people conforming 
behavior to the command of that system, and the perception of 
legitimacy is important. Likewise, in times of crisis—where people are 
more likely to question the authority of the government—legitimacy is 
essential. Finally, any extremes in the degree of perceived legitimacy will 
also be important. Should a legal system appear particularly illegitimate, 
that would cause more people to consider their reasons for maintaining 
the internal view. Likewise, a particularly legitimate system (for example, 
a system that is “fair and caters genuinely for the vital interests of all 
those from whom it demands obedience”49) generates powerful support 
for the internal view. 
Similarly, over the long term, the perception of legitimacy is 
important. Conformity works so long as most people conform, but it does 
not really give an independent reason to obey. Over time, people will ask 
questions about whether and why the law deserves their obedience. 
Conformity will not answer these questions, but legitimacy (or the 
perception of legitimacy) will. To the extent people believe the law is 
legitimate, they have an independent reason to maintain the internal view. 
It is worth noting that perceived legitimacy is defined purely as a 
sociological fact. A legal system is perceived as legitimate so long as the 
perceiver believes it has a moral right to govern as it does. The universe 
of principles that can inform the perception of legitimacy is not limited. 
One could believe a legal system is legitimate for any reason—good, bad, 
or nonsensical.50 The perception of legitimacy, like the internal view, is 
 
 49. Id. at 202. 
 50. Someone may conclude the legal system is legitimate because it is the legal system that has 
been in place for over two hundred years. Another may conclude it is illegitimate because it has not 
yet been in place for at least five hundred years. Both of these are unusual views, but that fact does not 
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merely a fact about a person’s beliefs. Accordingly, people may perceive 
a legal system to be legitimate even if the substance of that legal system 
were terribly unfair to many subjects.51 This is not a problem; it simply 
reflects the thinness of the definition of perceived legitimacy. 
3. Legal Expression Affects the Perception of Legitimacy 
“Expressivism” has been used to refer to many different ideas. I am 
using the term to refer to a theory of punishment that recognizes that 
punishment can only be properly understood in light of social values 
regarding the wrongdoing, the conviction, and the penalty.52 This is a 
relatively modest and uncontroversial claim.53 The fact that law has an 
expressive aspect generates “the power of the law to marshal social 
opprobrium,”54 and Mark Drumbl has suggested that this power can 
serve to “strengthen faith in rule of law among the general public.”55 
 Many scholars see this power as a beneficial consequence of a just 
legal system and thus attribute the expressive value of law to the perceived 
legitimacy of the law: Where the legal system is perceived as legitimate, 
legal actions will have an expressive function that can influence behavior.56 
This formulation is correct, but it is also incomplete. The expressive 
value of law can be positive or negative. A positive, or beneficial, 
expressive value of law exists where the law is perceived as morally 
legitimate. There can also be a negative, or harmful, expressive value of 
law where the law is perceived as morally illegitimate.57 
As a positive force, expression leverages respect for the law—or the 
law’s political capital qua law—to influence substantive beliefs about an 
 
change that each person would have a view about the legitimacy of the legal system. 
 51. See Hart, supra note 22, at 200 (considering the example of slave-owning societies). 
 52. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 420 
(1999) (“The expressive theory of punishment says we can’t identify criminal wrongdoing and 
punishment independently of their social meanings.”). 
 53. Heidi Hurd has criticized a much stronger form of expressivism that purports to justify 
punishment. See Heidi M. Hurd, Expressing Doubts About Expressivism, 2005 U. Chi. Legal F. 405, 417 
(describing the “expressivist, who maintains that punishment is justified if and only if it properly 
denounces or contradicts the social meaning of an offender’s actions”). I do not claim that the expressive 
aspect of punishment justifies punishment; I claim only that the expressive aspect of punishment can and 
does have consequences, most directly for the perceived legitimacy of the legal system. 
 54. Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 Geo. L.J. 
1509, 1536 (2009). 
 55. Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law 173 (2007). 
 56. See Starr, supra note 54, at 1537 (“[T]he expressive value of law turns on its perceived moral 
legitimacy, without which it cannot effectively shape social norms.”). 
 57. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the Relationship 
Between The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law and The Expressive Function of Punishment, 5 Buff. 
Crim. L. Rev. 145, 169 (2001) (“The message expressed by punishments, especially the moral message, 
is likely to be shaped in large part by the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system.”). 
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issue.58 Over time, if legal expressions of condemnation are decently 
aligned with society’s values (that is, if the law tends to condemn conduct 
that society independently condemns), then the law earns a sort of 
expressive power to influence societal norms.59 As a negative force, 
expression limits legal power; respect for the law is delicate, and should 
the legal expression stray too far from strongly and widely held norms, it 
risks undermining the perception of legitimacy and the internal view. 
The theory that punishment has a distinctive expressive component is 
most strongly associated with Joel Feinberg.60 Many scholars have 
distinguished prices from punishments by the relation between the amount 
of penalty and the harm caused.61 A price is meant to mirror the harm 
caused, and thus serves to internalize that cost to the actor; a punishment 
imposes significantly greater costs on the actor than the harm caused, and 
thus serves to dissuade the action altogether.62 Feinberg adds to this 
concept that the difference between punishment and pricing is not just one 
of degree, but of kind. Actions that are priced are acceptable (if the price 
is paid); actions that are punished are not acceptable (even if the 
punishment is imposed). Therefore, when someone is punished, that 
 
 58. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453, 457 
(1997) (“If [the criminal law] earns a reputation as a reliable statement of what the community, given 
sufficient information and time to reflect, would perceive as condemnable, people are more likely to 
defer to its commands as morally authoritative and as appropriate to follow in those borderline cases 
in which the propriety of certain conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the mind of the actor.”). 
 59. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-
Shaping Policy, 1990 Duke L.J. 1, 17 (1990) (identifying shaping preferences as an important, if 
frequently ignored, purpose of criminal punishment); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Authentically Innocent: Juries 
and Federal Regulatory Crimes, 59 Hastings L.J. 137, 190 (2007) (referencing “campaigns to prosecute 
‘dead-beat dads’ or drunk drivers” as examples of the use of criminal law to shift societal norms); 
Robinson & Darley, supra note 58, at 457 (“[T]he criminal law’s most important real-world effect may 
be its ability to assist in the building, shaping, and maintaining of . . . norms and moral principles.”). 
 60. See Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 98 
(1970) (identifying the “symbolic significance” and the “expression of attitudes of resentment and 
indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation” as distinctive aspects of punishment); 
see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 404 (1958) 
(“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the 
judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”). 
 61. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law 
Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 Yale L.J. 1875, 1876 (1991); Robert Cooter, Prices 
and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523, 1523–24 (1984). But see Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil 
Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 201, 204–05 (1996) (“[T]he prohibition-pricing 
distinction . . . fail[s] to account for the wide range of substantive differences between [criminal law 
and tort law].”). 
 62. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1876 (“The difference between a price and a sanction is at 
bottom the difference between, on one hand, a tax that brings private and public costs into balance by 
forcing the actor to internalize costs that the actor’s conduct imposes on others and, on the other, a 
significantly discontinuous increase in the expected cost of the behavior that is intended to dissuade 
the actor from engaging in the activity at all.”). 
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punishment carries an expressive component—a judgment against the 
person punished. 
Feinberg specifically identifies the “reprobative symbolism of 
punishment” as the necessary expressive value.63 Punishment is commonly 
understood as the imposition of some hardship, or deprivation of a 
privilege—what Feinberg labels the “hard treatment” aspect of 
punishment.64 But hard treatment without some form of condemnation is 
not punishment.65 For Feinberg, both hard treatment and reprobative 
symbolism are required for something to be punishment.66 Thus, just as 
hard treatment without condemnation is not punishment, so too 
condemnation without hard treatment is not punishment.67 
But what really is this expression of condemnation? Legal systems, 
such as they are, do not really communicate. Who would be speaking? 
Would meaning be related to intention and, if so, whose intention? The 
judge communicates in imposing a punishment, but in doing so she 
speaks on behalf of, or as an element of, the legal system. It makes no 
sense to think of a legal system, as a whole, communicating. How would 
the legal system develop the intention to communicate? 
The expression in punishment is best understood as a non-linguistic, 
symbolic expression.68 It does not matter what is intended, or by whom; 
someone observing the legal action of punishing will witness the 
expression of reprobation. If she does not observe the expression of 
reprobation, she will not identify the act as punishment (instead, it would 
be something more like a fine, restitution, or remedy). 
Joseph Raz touches on why we identify expressions in legal actions: 
[T]he law makes certain claims for itself. Given that it is institutionalized, 
in that its norms can be changed and applied by institutions, and given 
that the institutions make certain statements and perform other speech 
 
 63. See Feinberg, supra note 60, at 98. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Feinberg distinguishes “reprobation” from “resentment,” and uses “condemnation . . . as a 
kind of fusing of resentment and reprobation.” Id. at 101 (emphasis omitted). By resentment, Feinberg 
is referring to “the various vengeful attitudes,” and by reprobation, he refers to “the stern judgment of 
disapproval.” Id. I am less confident that the vengeful attitudes, or resentment, have a role in a legal 
system, and use the more general term, condemnation, to refer simply to reprobation, or “the stern 
judgment of disapproval.” For a fascinating argument that vengeful attitudes do have a critical role in 
a legal system, see Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law 139–
52 (1997). 
 66. Feinberg, supra note 60, at 10i.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Matthew Adler argues that expressivists must be arguing that there is a linguistic meaning in 
legal actions. See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1363, 1384–85 (2000) (agreeing that legal actions have non-linguistic meanings, but suggesting 
that expressivists generally argue for a specifically linguistic meaning). Joel Feinberg, however, seems 
expressly to be describing a symbolic expression in punishment. See Feinberg, supra note 60, at 98 
(“Punishment, in short, has a symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.”). 
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acts in the course of their official actions, we can identify the 
presuppositions of those statements and actions.69 
Raz is interested in presuppositions that actually and necessarily exist. 
Thus, he considers the example of an institution purporting to grant a 
particular right and concludes that the institution necessarily presupposes 
it has the normative power to grant that right, in that way.70 When the law 
imposes a punishment (understood as hard treatment and reprobation), 
the institution presupposes that the person being punished should be 
subject to reprobation. In this way, we can identify condemnation in the 
punishment: Condemnation accompanies the hard treatment where that 
hard treatment is labeled punishment. On the other hand, if someone 
witnessing or learning of the hard treatment believes it carries no 
reprobation, then he will not consider it punishment. 
Bernard Harcourt notes that, as a descriptive matter, punishment 
may also express values other than reprobation, like racial or political 
values: “a message about who is in control and about who gets 
controlled.”71 This makes sense: Why would the symbolism inherent in 
meting out hard treatment to people be limited to reprobation? Imposing 
punishment may express any number of values. 
The variable content of expression in punishment is related to the 
perceived legitimacy of the legal system. Where the law is not perceived 
as legitimate, the other types of expression identified by Harcourt may 
dominate.72 Punishment by what is perceived as an illegitimate authority 
will not be understood as expressing moral condemnation; it may be 
understood as expressing power, control, or will. Alternatively, it may be 
understood as expressing something more specific. For example, if a legal 
system disproportionately punishes black men for drug offenses, the 
punishment of an individual black man for a drug offense may primarily 
be understood—by one who questions the legitimacy of that legal 
system—as an expression of racial subjugation.73 
Therefore, although moral opprobrium is not the only expression 
generated by punishment, it is the archetypal one, and it ought to be the 
dominant one. Moreover, moral opprobrium can be distinguished from 
other forms of expression because it is the singular expression that must 
accompany punishment; its presence is part of what makes the hard 
treatment a punishment. Hard treatment that the law labels punishment 
may in fact fail to convey reprobation and, indeed, it may convey entirely 
 
 69. Raz, supra note 32, at 2. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Harcourt, supra note 57, at 168. 
 72. Id. at 168 (“Punishment usually also communicates, importantly, political, cultural, racial and 
ideological messages.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness (2010). 
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unrelated expressions about power or race or politics. However, conveying 
reprobation is part of the function of punishment in a way none of these 
other expressions are. 
B. The Normative Values That Influence How Legal Expressions 
Are Perceived 
A legal system that is widely perceived as generating legitimate 
expression will be more stable and well functioning, but people subject to 
a legal system perceive legal expressions in accordance with their own 
morals or normative stance. People’s norms matter to what expression 
they perceive and whether they perceive the legal system as legitimate. 
The calculation here is more nuanced than simply whether one agrees 
with the outcome. A person who believes narcotics are harmful and 
ought to be forbidden by the government may or may not identify 
positive expression when a person convicted of selling narcotics is 
sentenced to twenty years in prison for a repeat offense. Although the 
sentence is the end result of a general policy with which he agrees 
(criminalizing the sale of narcotics), he may disagree with the penalty 
itself, finding it either too harsh or not severe enough. Likewise, someone 
who believes the government has no role regulating what substances 
people put in their bodies may or may not find the expression inherent in 
the punishment legitimate. Though she disagrees with the general policy 
that results in the sentence, she may believe that the democratic process 
by which the penalty was established is a higher good than the liberty she 
would like to have preserved. Moreover, she may believe that all 
legitimately enacted and sufficiently publicized criminal laws ought to be 
obeyed, and that the defendant’s failure to obey the drug laws—laws she 
substantively disagrees with—merits condemnation. The perception of 
legitimacy depends on alignment with moral values, but those moral 
values may relate to matters beyond the substance of the law at issue. 
What norms affect views about legitimacy? The simplest answer is 
that any and all norms can. Any normative view held by any person 
subject to a legal system may be part of how that person assesses the legal 
system.74 Given the plurality of moral perspectives in most societies, there 
is unlikely ever to be consensus as to the legitimacy of the legal system.75 A 
person assessing legal actions and evaluating the legitimacy of those 
 
 74. Michael Walzer develops this idea more thoroughly, and more broadly than I need to, when 
he argues that “it is the meaning of goods that determines their movement.” Michael Walzer, 
Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 8 (1983). “All distributions [of all goods] 
are just or unjust relative to the social meanings of the goods at stake.” Id. at 9. As this Article is 
concerned with perceived, or sociological, legitimacy, my contention more modest than Walzer’s: The 
distribution of punishment will be perceived as just or unjust relative to the social meanings attached 
to the punishment. 
 75. See supra text accompanying notes 28–29. 
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actions will do so according to her own normative values. By way of 
example, consider the range of possible reactions to the imposition of a 
$1000 criminal fine (and no other penalty) on a person found guilty of 
insider trading by which he profited $1000. An advocate for unfettered 
markets might see this as an unjustified deprivation of wealth from a 
person who earned access to superior information. A believer in modern 
securities regulations might see this as an inadequate deterrent for failing 
to account for the ex ante possibility of avoiding detection. Both views 
would be critical of the legal action, and each would perceive negative 
expression in the legal action, but those perceived expressions would be 
entirely different. The person who believed any penalty to be wrong 
might perceive expressions offensive to liberty and supportive of an 
undesirable positive equality. The person who believed the penalty 
inadequate might perceive the opposite: expressions offensive to equality 
and supportive of an undesirable negative liberty. More simply, the former 
would perceive legal condemnation of morally acceptable conduct; the 
latter would perceive tacit legal acceptance of morally condemnable 
conduct. Our normative values will determine how we interpret legal 
actions; expression in law is thus contingent on normative values. 
At this point, one could be forgiven for asking: What’s the use of this 
model if perceived legitimacy is determined by the set of all norms that 
exist among all people subject to a legal system? Given the breadth of 
possibility inherent in the fact that any normative view will influence the 
assessment of legitimacy for the person who holds it, I suggest that what 
ought to interest us is not every moral view, but rather those that are 
shared by many people. Insofar as the purpose of the inquiry is to assess 
the stability and efficiency of the legal system,76 what matters is having 
more people perceive the system as more legitimate.77 There is no more 
stable and efficient legal system than one in which all subjects perceive the 
law as maximally legitimate. From there it is a sliding scale of decreasing 
stability and efficiency, as fewer people perceive the law as maximally 
legitimate, and as more people perceive the law as less legitimate. 
1. Substantive Norms and Procedural Norms 
Normative values that inform people’s perception of the legal 
system can be divided into substantive norms and procedural norms. In 
this Subpart, I argue that procedural norms matter more than substantive 
 
 76. As opposed to making a deontological claim about what Solum has labeled normative 
legitimacy. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
 77. Well, not quite. This is an oversimplification. What probably matters in practice is not merely 
having more people perceive greater legitimacy, but having more of the right people perceive greater 
legitimacy (i.e., to account for the fact that in any group some individuals have disproportionate 
influence on the thinking of others). For purposes of this Article, I ignore this nuance. 
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norms to people’s assessment of legitimacy, and look to the work of Tom 
Tyler to identify widely shared procedural norms. 
Substantive norms are those related to the conduct regulated by law. 
For example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) makes it a 
crime to bribe foreign government officials.78 One might—independent 
of the law—believe it is wrong to bribe foreign government officials. 
Alternatively, one might see nothing wrong with bribing government 
officials in other countries. Both views are substantive value judgments 
about the conduct regulated by the FCPA. The former is aligned with the 
law and the latter is not. Whether one takes one of these views—or some 
other more nuanced view about the moral value of bribing foreign 
officials79—will influence how one perceives prosecutions and punishments 
of those who violate the FCPA. 
Alignment of substantive norms with the specific prohibitions of 
criminal law will obviously influence how people perceive prosecutions, 
but it will not generally explain the adoption of the internal view. This is 
perhaps counter-intuitive; after all, is not the primary criterion for 
whether one believes a law to be legitimate actually whether one 
normatively agrees with the purpose and function of the law? Probably 
not. In fact, were this the primary criterion for perceived legitimacy, 
complex modern legal systems would enjoy very little perception of 
legitimacy. The substantive normative scope of a legal system is simply too 
broad, diverse, and normatively inconsistent to satisfy many people in 
terms of agreement with the substantive norms promoted by the system. 
The federal criminal law addresses issues as diverse as speech,80 firearms,81 
narcotics,82 taxes,83 water hyacinths,84 family obligations,85 odious motives,86 
 
 78. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012). 
 79. For example, Andrew Spalding has argued that FCPA enforcement may not have the salutary 
effect on corruption sought by its supporters. Noting that increased FCPA enforcement of business in 
developing countries has the effect of reducing foreign direct investment in that country, see Andrew 
B. Spalding, The Irony of International Business Law: U.S. Progressivism and China’s New Laissez 
Faire, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 354, 405 (2011) (summarizing empirical studies and concluding that the 
“latest empirical data suggests that antibribery legislation has a deterrent effect on investment in 
countries where bribery is perceived to be more prevalent”), Spalding suggests that the reduction of 
foreign direct investment by companies from countries with progressive anti-bribery legislation and 
enforcement threatens to limit constructive engagement, leaving a vacuum quickly occupied by more 
opportunistic nations, less concerned with the impact of bribery. Id. at 406–10. Therefore, according to 
Spalding, more aggressive FCPA enforcement could lead to more, not less, corruption.   
 80. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2011) (“Statements or entries generally”). 
 81. See, e.g., id. § 922 (“Unlawful acts [of firearm possession]”). 
 82. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2011) (“Prohibited acts [of drug trafficking and manufacture]”). 
 83. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2011) (“Attempt to evade or defeat tax”). 
 84. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 46 (“Transportation of water hyacinths”). 
 85. See, e.g., id. § 228 (“Failure to pay legal child support obligations”). 
 86. See, e.g., id. § 249 (“Hate crimes acts”). 
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associations,87 gambling,88 obscenity,89 commercial competition,90 loyalty to 
country,91 and democracy.92 This is only a limited selection from the broad 
scope of federal criminal law, and yet the likelihood of any one person 
agreeing with each of these laws is low. Moreover, consider that “agreeing 
with each of these laws” entails not only the relatively simple question of 
whether the type of conduct ought to be permitted or not, but also the 
more nuanced matters such as drawing lines between legitimate and 
illegitimate conduct and identifying the appropriate penalty for violations. 
The fact is, people in a complex legal system will be accustomed to 
disagreeing with the substance of the law, but substantive disagreement 
does not undermine the perceived legitimacy of a legal system until it 
becomes a very strong and important substantive disagreement. 
As Tom Tyler writes, describing these substantive norms as 
“personal morality”: “Unlike legitimacy, personal morality is double-
edged. It may accord with the dictates of authorities and as a result help 
to promote compliance with the law, but on the other hand it may lead to 
resisting the law and legal authorities.”93 
Where the dictates of authorities become too contrary to one’s 
personal morality (on matters that are sufficiently important), the 
substance of those dictates will undermine the perception of legitimacy. 
Most of the time, however, people are willing to accept as legitimate laws 
of which they substantively disapprove. 
Perceived legitimacy is therefore mostly influenced by procedural 
norms.94 Procedural norms concern the fairness—or lack thereof—of 
legal procedures. Tyler has extensively studied procedural norms, 
specifically considering the relationships between people’s experience 
with the legal system, their attitudes toward the legal system and their 
relative compliance with laws.95 The first thing to note about procedural 
norms is that, like substantive norms, they are neither universal96 nor 
absolute.97 Nonetheless, Tyler conducted extensive surveys of 1575 
 
 87. See, e.g., id. § 521 (“Criminal street gangs”). 
 88. See, e.g., id. § 1084 (“Transmission of wagering information; penalties”). 
 89. See, e.g., id. § 1461 (“Mailing obscene or crime-inciting matter”). 
 90. See, e.g., id. § 1832 (“Theft of trade secrets”). 
 91. See, e.g., id. § 2339A (“Providing material support to terrorists”). 
 92. See, e.g., id. § 201 (“Bribery of public officials and witnesses”). 
 93. Tyler, supra note 30, at 26. 
 94. See Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of 
Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 661, 663 (2007) (“[P]eople are 
more interested in how fairly their case is handled than they are in whether they win . . . . [N]umerous 
studies conducted over the last several decades have consistently found this to be true.”). 
 95. See Tyler, supra note 30. 
 96. See id. at 156 (“[T]he meaning of procedural justice changes in response to the nature of 
people’s experiences with legal authorities.”). 
 97. See id. (“[I]ndividuals do not have a single schema of fair procedure to apply in all situations.”). 
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randomly selected people in Chicago to get data on attitudes toward the 
legal system, including views on procedural justice and behavior relative 
to the legal system.98 Of the 1575 people surveyed, a “randomly selected 
subset of 804 respondents was reinterviewed one year later.”99 The data 
were analyzed for the full set of respondents to understand “the 
relationship between attitudes and behavior measured at one point in 
time,” while the subset of 804 respondents interviewed twice was 
analyzed “to examine the relationship between changes in attitudes and 
changes in behavior.”100 
Tyler concludes that procedural norms matter a great deal to 
assessments of legitimacy.101 Moreover, he was able to identify “different 
aspects of procedure [that] independently influenced judgments about 
whether the procedure was fair,”102 including: 
 “a belief on the part of those involved that they had an opportunity to 
take part in the decision-making process”103 
 “judgments about the neutrality of the decision-making process”104 
 judgments about whether the decisionmakers are “honest and . . . reach 
their decisions based on objective information about the case”105 
 “being treated politely”106 
 “inferences about the motives of the authorities”107 
 “whether the procedures produce fair outcomes.”108 
Tyler’s approach is more detailed and nuanced than necessary for this 
Article: For example, the distinction between a decisionmaker’s neutrality, 
honesty, and motives are fine ones, and they may be difficult to parse in 
practice. But generally the results suggest tremendous practical utility. 
Tyler’s study gives us a set of criteria that are widely shared and that will 
tend to reflect on the fairness of a procedure. In the next Subpart, I 
 
 98. Id. at 8. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. at 107 (“The results of the Chicago study support the finding of earlier research that 
procedural justice is generally important [to perceptions of legitimacy].”). Tyler further found that 
procedural justice was more important when the experience assessed involved courts (as opposed to 
police), was in dispute, was voluntary, or had an unfavorable outcome; for experiences involving 
police, no dispute, involuntary contact, or favorable outcomes, procedural justice still mattered, but to 
a lesser degree. See id. at 105. 
 102. Id. at 163. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 163–64. 
 105. Id. at 164. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. This is a particularly interesting factor in that it is a sort of hybrid between the substantive, 
outcome-based norms and the procedural-based norms. Still, “[f]air outcomes are one thing that 
people expect from a fair procedure, and a procedure that consistently produces unfair outcomes will 
eventually be viewed as unfair itself.” Id. 
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consider how these criteria reflect on the current practice of prosecuting 
corporations. 
2. Normative Values That Inform Perceptions of Corporate 
Prosecutions 
Corporate prosecutions will be assessed against applicable substantive 
and procedural norms.109 In the first instance, for any alleged criminal act, 
there will be substantive norms about that act itself. These types of norms 
were addressed above by considering the example of bribing foreign 
officials in violation of the FCPA.110 Some people will morally disapprove 
of the conduct that is the basis for the criminal charge, and others will 
not. These norms can be widely divergent without necessarily disrupting 
the internal view of law.111 
As addressed above,112 procedural norms tend to dominate legitimacy 
assessments. Whether people perceive as fair the processes by which 
corporations are prosecuted, charged, convicted, and punished will 
influence their view of the legitimacy of prosecuting corporations 
generally. Of the values identified by Tyler and listed above,113 all would 
seem relevant to how corporate prosecutions are perceived except, 
perhaps, the concept of being treated politely (because it is unclear what it 
means to treat a corporation politely).114 The other values, however, do 
seem applicable to corporate prosecutions and will be considered in Part II 
in assessing how well the current practice of prosecuting corporations 
serves its expressive purpose. 
II.  Two Examples of Corporate Prosecutions as Expressive 
Failures 
Corporate prosecutions generate a number of expressions, including 
most simply that corporations—just like individuals—are forbidden from 
engaging in criminal conduct.115 Certain prosecutions, however, risk 
generating negative expressions that can undermine the perceived 
 
 109. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 110. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2011). 
 111. See Tyler, supra note 30, at 235 n.11 (“Research on the American political system has found 
that in general people have at least some reservoir of goodwill toward legal and political authorities, 
even if they are marginal members of society.”). 
 112. See supra text accompanying notes 94–108. 
 113. See supra text accompanying notes 103–108. 
 114. Of course, corporations act through real persons, even in their dealings with prosecutors, and 
politeness will matter to the people involved in those meetings. However, the public has little or no 
opportunity to observe the interaction between corporate representatives and law enforcement officials. 
Accordingly, the degree of politeness in these interactions is unlikely to influence perceptions of 
legitimacy (except, perhaps, for those few attorneys or corporate employees privy to the interaction). 
 115. See generally Gilchrist, supra note 19. 
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legitimacy of the legal system. In this Part, I consider two corporate 
prosecutions that have generated negative expression. Each failed, in 
different ways, to serve the expressive purpose that justifies holding 
corporations criminally liable in the first place, and neither is atypical. I did 
not select these cases because they are particularly noteworthy; rather, I 
selected them because they illustrate fairly common problems with 
corporate prosecutions. Both involve prosecutions of parent corporations 
for the actions of employees of subsidiaries. Beyond that, however, the 
prosecutions are quite different. One resulted in a trial and conviction of 
the corporation, the other in a civil resolution. Both illustrate particular 
problems with modern corporate prosecutions failing to align with the 
widely shared procedural norms identified in the preceding Subparts.116 
A. The Prosecution and Conviction of AML, Inc. 
1. The Prosecution 
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. (“AML”) was a Miami-based 
corporation that owned and operated a number of medical businesses.117 
Among these business were “eight commercial plasmapheresis centers” 
engaged in the collection and sale of plasma.118 One of those centers was 
separately incorporated as Richmond Plasma Corporation (“RPC”), a 
wholly owned subsidiary of AML.119 As with most medical businesses, the 
collection and sale of plasma is heavily regulated.120 Following regulatory 
difficulties in 1977 and 1978, AML created “a special office for the specific 
purpose of assuring compliance with federal regulations at AML plasma 
centers.”121 Hugo Partucci was designated to run this compliance office.122 
Partucci was employed by yet another wholly owned AML subsidiary, and 
he had worked since 1972 serving as the head of a number of different 
AML-owned plasmapheresis centers.123 Notably, prior to being assigned to 
run the new compliance office, “Partucci was responsible for assuring 
compliance at RPC and at least two other plasma centers.”124 
 
 116. See supra Part I.B.1–2. 
 117. United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 401 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 400–01. 
 120. Id. at 400 n.1 (“Such facilities must register with and be licensed by the FDA. They are also 
required by Federal regulation to maintain extensive records regarding a variety of matters such as 
donor screening, equipment testing, and the collection, storage and disposition of plasma. The FDA is 
authorized to inspect plasmapheresis facilities and their records to ensure compliance with applicable 
regulations.”). 
 121. Id. at 401. 
 122. Id. at 400–01. 
 123. Id. at 401. 
 124. Id. 
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By late 1978, Partucci, accompanied by a few lower-level employees, 
had begun “periodic inspection at various AML centers to discover and 
correct any deficiencies in compliance with FDA regulations.”125 Finding 
numerous regulatory deficiencies, particularly at RPC, compliance team 
members began instructing employees “to falsify and fabricate records to 
conceal these deficiencies.”126 They did so at Partucci’s instruction.127 
Partucci was the highest level employee alleged to have any involvement 
in the fraudulent activity. 
AML was convicted, and on appeal it argued that “the Government 
failed to prove the ‘element’ that its agents’ criminal acts were undertaken 
primarily to benefit AML.”128 Moreover, AML had specific policies 
forbidding the exact conduct engaged in by Partucci and other lower-level 
employees; therefore, AML argued, the conduct was outside the scope of 
their employment.129 The Fourth Circuit had little difficulty rejecting 
these arguments. The corporate policy argument was dismissed on the 
basis of prior precedent.130 The Fourth Circuit was no more moved by the 
argument that there was insufficient evidence of intent to benefit AML. 
The court opined that “it would seem clear” Partucci’s actions were 
undertaken, at least in part, with intent to benefit AML, and noted that 
“it is not necessary for an agent’s actions to have actually benefited the 
corporate entity.”131 
2. The Expressive Problem: Mere Respondeat Superior Liability 
The AML case is interesting because it demonstrates how little is 
required for a corporation to be vicariously liable for the acts of its 
employees. The court’s analysis appears to be correct. AML was 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 406. 
 129. Id. at 407 (“[M]any of their actions were unlawful and contrary to corporate policy . . . .”). 
 130. Id. at 406 (“[A] corporation may be held criminally responsible for antitrust violations 
committed by its employees if they were acting within the scope of their authority, or apparent 
authority, and for the benefit of the corporation even if . . . such acts were against corporate policy or 
express instructions.” (quoting United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983))). 
 131. Id. at 407 (citing Oil Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1945)). This is not 
an unusual or surprising rule. Were corporations immune unless the crime redounded to their actual 
benefit, corporations would almost never be criminally liable. After all, the issue arises only when the 
perpetrators are caught; the calculus is thus inherently skewed away from actual benefit because of the 
inclusion of the costs of detection, investigation, defense, and criminal penalties. See United States v. 
Ionia Mgmt., 526 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323 (D. Conn. 2007) (quoting J.C.B. Super Mkts, Inc. v. United 
States, 530 F.2d 1119, 1122 (2d Cir. 1976) (“The suggestion that the employee’s wrongful act did not 
advance the interests of the employer and therefore should not be imputed to it entirely overlooks the 
basic concept of respondeat superior. Presumably no tortious act by an agent redounds to the benefit 
of the principal where the latter is held responsible for the damage which results. Yet if this reasoning 
were followed no principal would ever be liable.”). 
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challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal following conviction. 
The question for the appellate court, accordingly, was only whether “the 
jury could rationally have reached a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”132 Given that it was possible that Partucci’s fraud would inure to 
the benefit of AML, it would not be unreasonable for a juror to conclude 
that he intended it to be so.133 That conviction, however, tells us nothing 
about the degree to which AML itself should be condemned for the crime. 
Prior to the compliance inspections that led to fabricating records, 
Partucci was responsible for compliance with regulations at RCL.134 
Therefore, according to the appellate record, Partucci was responsible 
both for the regulatory failings that led to the cover-up and for the cover-
up itself. Was the cover-up to protect AML or to protect Partucci? 
The most obvious reason for Partucci to engage in a cover-up was to 
protect himself. It is entirely possible that no part of Partucci’s conduct 
was to benefit AML—it was to save his own hide. The Fourth Circuit did 
note that the intent to benefit rule would serve “to insulate the corporation 
from criminal liability for actions of its agents which be inimical to the 
interests of the corporation or which may have been undertaken solely to 
advance the interests of that agent or of a party other than the 
corporation.”135 The court avoided this possibility by concentrating on the 
question of the scope of authority: “AML had specifically assigned to these 
individuals the responsibility for assuring compliance by its plasmapheresis 
centers with FDA regulations. In instructing other employees regarding 
compliance with applicable regulations, Partucci and the others were 
acting within the scope of their authority or certainly within their apparent 
authority.”136 
AML assigned Partucci to ensure compliance; by ordering fabrication 
and falsification of records, Partucci was—in a criminal and expressly 
forbidden manner—ensuring compliance. Had he not been caught, the 
cover-up presumably would have benefitted AML (because it would not 
have been subject to regulatory sanctions for non-compliance). That 
rationale was sufficient for the Fourth Circuit to conclude that it was clear 
Partucci acted to benefit AML.137 
 
 132. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984). 
 133. For example, personnel other than Partucci were involved in the falsification and fabrication. 
Perhaps the involvement of multiple employees convinced jurors that the conduct was done to benefit 
AML, not to protect Partucci. Moreover, the conduct continued after Partucci left the company, and 
this also could suggest that the conduct was not to protect Partucci (although, the continuation of 
fabrication and falsification seems just as likely explained by employees, having engaged in initial 
falsehoods, protecting themselves by continuing the falsehoods to avoid detection). 
 134. See Automated Med. Labs., 770 F.2d at 401. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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We might blame AML for negligence in selecting Partucci to run 
RCL and selecting him to head the compliance review.138 But even that is 
probably a stretch. We have no information about whether or how AML 
conducted diligence on Partucci and his ability and integrity. We do not 
know if Partucci lied to AML to get these positions; we do not know if 
AML complied with or even exceeded the industry standard in vetting 
Partucci. We cannot really say, with the benefit of hindsight, much more 
than that AML choose poorly in hiring and appointing Partucci. But that 
is neither a controversial statement nor a helpful one: Senior officers at 
AML would almost surely agree, regardless of whether they share any 
blame in the wrongdoing. 
One might question whether an entity can, in any reasonable sense, 
be blamed.139 In The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, I wrote that 
corporations deserve neither blame nor fairness.140 Simply put, 
corporations do not deserve blame or fairness because they lack the 
capacities necessary for moral desert.141 They can, nevertheless, be blamed. 
Whereas desert is a distinctive moral concept strongly associated with 
blame, blame is sociological fact: One can blame or not blame—the reason 
or lack of reason for blaming does not change the fact of blaming. That 
said, blame can be silly or unreasonable, or it can be based in something 
sensible. Attribution of fault to a tree branch that falls on me can be real, 
though probably not reasonable. Attribution of fault to a corporation can 
be both real and reasonable because corporations—largely through their 
cultures,142 reporting structures, and incentive plans—influence the 
behavior of employees and agents.143 Furthermore, in certain cases, the 
 
 138. Whether negligence is condemnable is a subject of lengthy and complex debate. See, e.g., 
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 149–57 (2009) (arguing that the carelessness that 
caused one to be unaware of the risk is a basis for culpability and thus negligence may be punished); 
Joseph Raz, Responsibility and the Negligence Standard, 30 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 16 (2010) 
(identifying a set of omissions avoidable but for a malfunction of rational capacities as negligence for 
which one can properly be held responsible). But see Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd, Punishing 
the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence, 5 Crim. L. & Phil. 
147, 165 (2011) (arguing that not all negligence is the result of unexercised capacity and thus 
blameworthy). I do not address this (exceedingly difficult) issue in this Article. 
 139. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 
46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1359, 1392 (2009) (arguing that blaming and punishing corporations is puerile). 
 140. See generally Gilchrist, supra note 19. 
 141. See infra text accompanying notes 151–157. 
 142. Ian B. Lee, Corporate Criminal Responsibility as Team Member Responsibility, 31 Oxford J. 
Legal Stud. 755, 772 (2011) (describing corporations as teams and identifying positive and negative 
cultural values promoted by teams). 
 143. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 Ind. L.J. 473, 491 
(2006) (“Institutions influence people in ways that sometimes make it rational to blame institutions for 
what people do.”); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated 
Governance, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 487, 493 n.16 (2003) (“[M]anagement’s commitment to corporate ethics, 
organizational culture, and institutional incentive structure have been determined to significantly 
influence the level of organizational misconduct.”); see also Gilchrist, supra note 19, at 9–14. 
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failure to establish any clear culture on a particular topic (e.g., a 
corporation’s failure to communicate to its agents and employees the value 
of compliance with environmental regulations) might be seen as an 
omission on the part of the corporation that negatively influenced (or 
failed to properly influence) an individual agent. 
I previously introduced the example of Corporations Alpha and 
Beta, which had very different cultures regarding foreign bribery and 
corruption.144 Corporation Alpha had a strong culture of compliance with 
U.S. law, including the FCPA, that included vigorous training and 
appropriate incentives to encourage compliance with the law.145 
Corporation Beta not only lacked that culture, but it also had a reporting 
and pay structure that clearly increased the risk people would violate the 
FCPA in order to benefit themselves within the corporation.146 A culture 
of compliance is no guarantee of full compliance, so it remains possible 
that an employee of Alpha could violate the FCPA. However, were that 
to happen, people would likely be less condemning of Corporation 
Alpha (as a whole), than they would of Corporation Beta if one of its 
employees violated the same law in the same manner. Corporation 
Alpha was structured to avoid the wrongdoing; Corporation Beta was 
structured in a way that facilitated the wrongdoing. The latter is more 
likely to be condemned (although both could be held criminally liable).147 
In a case like AML, where there is no apparent reason to blame the 
company, the special expressive function of criminal sanctions is inactive at 
best. The prosecution against AML illustrates the extent to which the 
doctrine of respondeat superior can permit criminal liability that is entirely 
detached from meaningful culpability. Mere respondeat superior liability 
(that is, cases in which the acts of a single or few relatively low-level 
employees give rise to liability) can generate prosecutions unaccompanied 
by any meaningful condemnation of the corporation. While people might 
condemn the corporation if the corporate culture fostered an environment 
in which the law was more likely to be violated,148 a corporation can be 
criminally liable without this cultural element.149 In such a case, there is 
 
 144. See Gilchrist, supra note 19, at 11–14 (explaining the Corporations Alpha and Beta example). 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909). 
 148. See Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1503, 1532 
(2007) (“Companies can develop distinctive cultures (or an ethos) including values that are contrary to 
general norms, which they encourage their employees to flout.”); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A 
Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1095, 1123 (1991) (“Much of the 
voluminous business literature on corporate culture is premised on the notion that organizations have 
distinctive cultures.”); see also Gilchrist, supra note 19, pt. I (explaining why corporate culture is relevant 
to the degree of condemnation toward a corporation whose agents violate the law). 
 149. See N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 494 (“[I]mputing [the corporate agent’s] act to his employer and 
imposing penalties upon the corporation for which he is acting in the premises [can help control an 
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little or no reason to condemn the corporation qua corporation, and the 
criminal law is being used without any expressive aspect. Sara Beale points 
out that a safety valve exists: 
In practical terms . . . the consequences of the respondeat superior 
doctrine are substantially mitigated by the Department of Justice’s 
prosecutorial guidelines, which instruct federal prosecutors to consider 
factors that correlate with corporate fault, such as whether the 
wrongdoing in question was pervasive within the corporation, whether 
the corporation had a history of similar conduct, and whether the 
corporation had in place an active compliance program that was 
implemented in an effective manner.150 
While Beale is right to note that guidelines and prosecutorial discretion 
limit the application of respondeat superior liability, such liability 
nonetheless remains the rule, and the AML prosecution demonstrates 
that, at least sometimes, corporations are prosecuted for mere respondeat 
superior liability. 
Where a legal system purports to “punish” a corporation by imposing 
hard treatment and the perceiver fails to see a reason to condemn the 
corporation, there is dissonance between the legal act and its expression. 
The legal system is saying this is punishment (that is, hard treatment plus 
reprobation), but the perceiver sees no reprobation because there is no 
basis for condemnation. People are unlikely to blame just because 
something is called punishment.151 
This expressive dissonance might be resolved in a number of ways, 
and none of them are good for the perceived legitimacy of the legal 
system. First, people might begin to discount the law’s assessment of 
what merits condemnation (that is, the law claims to be condemning this 
non-blameworthy person; therefore, I reject the law’s assessment of what 
is blameworthy). A legal system that blames the non-blameworthy will 
be deemed less legitimate.152 It is, to return to Tyler’s criteria, resorting to 
procedures that do not produce fair outcomes.153 
Second, people might come to believe that no condemnation 
accompanies the hard treatment and, accordingly, that the hard treatment 
is more like a fine than a punishment as defined by Feinberg.154 At first, 
this alternative might seem better for maintaining the perceived legitimacy 
 
agent].”). 
 150. Beale, supra note 148, at 1516–17 (footnotes omitted). 
 151. That is, except at the margins, where the perceived legitimacy of the law is strong and 
independent norms about the subject of the punishment are weak. It is in these cases that the expressive 
power of the law can be harnessed to shift societal norms. 
 152.  Tyler, supra note 30, at 172 (“If people have an experience not characterized by fair 
procedures, their later compliance with the law will be based less strongly on the legitimacy of legal 
authorities. Therefore, not experiencing fair procedures undermines legitimacy.”). 
 153. Id. at 164. 
 154. See Feinberg, supra note 60, at 96.  
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of the legal system because it does not involve a dissonance between the 
apparent intent of the law and the beliefs of the perceiver (i.e., the 
perceiver fails to identify any effort by the law to condemn, and this is 
consistent with her belief that there is no basis to condemn; rather, a 
redistributive, remedial, or incenting fine or tax is being imposed). 
However, failure to recognize condemnation in a criminal penalty has a 
different cost: It dilutes the meaning of criminal penalties. Where the 
criminal process is used to impose hard treatment devoid of reprobative 
value, the association between criminal sanction and reprobation is 
undermined because it is no longer the case that the imposition of criminal 
liability is something special, reserved for those whose action merits 
condemnation.155 
None of which is to suggest that there is not good reason to penalize 
AML; after all, AML is in the best position to prevent this sort of 
wrongdoing, and imposing a penalty will incentivize AML and similarly 
situated companies to use more care in appointing, training, and 
supervising compliance personnel. The FDA cannot actively monitor or 
audit every required record for every company. There must be 
consequences for companies that violate the regulations to induce 
companies subject to the regulations to apply resources toward 
compliance. Yet this straightforward deterrence can be achieved just as 
well, and more efficiently, through civil remedies without undermining the 
perceived legitimacy of the legal system or the expressive value of criminal 
law.156 
By imposing a criminal penalty on a company that people feel is not 
blameworthy, the legal system will either undermine its own legitimacy 
as people discount the law’s commitment to fairness, or it will undermine 
the expressive function of criminal sanction as people dissociate criminal 
liability from blameworthiness. AML serves as an example of this risk.157 
 
 155. John Coffee expressed this concern two decades ago, writing about the encroachment of 
substantive criminal law into matters traditionally left to civil law: 
[T]he criminal law should not be overused. This position stems not only from the usual fairness 
considerations, but also from a sense (at least on my part) that overuse will impair the criminal 
law’s nondeterrent functions. Recent scholarship has emphasized the criminal law’s socializing 
role as a system for moral education. In similar terms, economists have viewed the criminal law 
as an instrument for shaping preferences as well as for imposing costs. This “preference-
shaping” role posits that the criminal law can and should affect not simply the rational actor’s 
perception of the costs of crime, but also the actor’s perception of the benefits from crime. To 
perform this role, however, the criminal law’s scope must be limited because society’s capacity 
to focus censure and blame is among its scarcest resources. 
Coffee, supra note 61, at 1877 (footnotes omitted). 
 156. See Gilchrist, supra note 19, at 41 n.237 (citing Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Criminal 
Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1477, 1532 (1996)). 
 157. I should add a few caveats here. First, it is possible—as a result of publicity or gossip around 
Miami—that the public had access to additional information (whether or not true) about AML that 
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B. The Prosecution of and Settlement with Johnson & Johnson, Inc. 
1. The Prosecution 
Pharmaceutical and medical device giant Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”) 
recently was prosecuted for violations of the FCPA.158 The resolution of 
the investigation demonstrates another set of expressive problems that can 
and do arise from corporate prosecutions. 
On April 8, 2011, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed with the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia a DPA it had entered 
into with J&J.159 The agreement resolved the DOJ’s investigation of J&J 
and its subsidiaries for numerous violations of the FCPA.160 The 
investigation concerned illegal payments to foreign officials through the 
United Nations Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq, in addition to payments in 
Greece, Poland, and Romania.161 
Pursuant to the agreement, the DOJ filed a criminal information 
charging J&J subsidiary DePuy, Inc. with “conspiracy to commit an 
offense against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, that is, to 
violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.”162 J&J admitted that it 
was responsible for the acts violating the law as specified in the agreement, 
including those committed by its subsidiaries,163 and agreed to pay a 
monetary penalty of $21,400,000.164 J&J also agreed to extensive auditing 
and reporting requirements to the DOJ.165 In exchange, the DOJ agreed 
that if J&J complied with all its obligations under the agreement, after a 
period of three years the agreement would expire, the DOJ would 
dismiss with prejudice the information against DePuy, and the DOJ 
would pursue no further action against J&J or any of its subsidiaries for 
conduct covered by the agreement.166 
 
made it very comfortable with blaming the company. In that case, the expressive harms identified in 
this Part would not result; this Part is meant to demonstrate how respondeat superior can undermine 
perceived legitimacy, not to claim it invariably does so. Second, an expressive failure does not cripple a 
legal system. There will be expressive failures that cannot be remedied. I address some of these below. 
See infra Part II.C. The standard cannot be perfect expressive coherence, but perfect expressive 
coherence is the aspiration, and where there is an expressive failure that can be remedied, it ought to 
be. Finally, and related to the second point, one might question whether people really even notice 
these details. See infra Part III. 
 158. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2012). 
 159. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of Justice and J&J (Jan. 14, 2011) 
[hereinafter Johnson & Johnson DPA]. 
 160. Id. ¶ 2.a; id. at Attach. A. 
 161. Id. at Attach. A ¶¶ 1–101. 
 162. Id. ¶ 2. 
 163. Id. ¶ 2.a. 
 164. Id. ¶ 6.e. 
 165. Id. ¶ 11. 
 166. Id. ¶ 12. 
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In addition, the agreement specifically noted: “Were the Department 
to initiate a prosecution of J&J or one of its operating companies and 
obtain a conviction, instead of entering into this Agreement to defer 
prosecution, J&J could be subject to exclusion from participation in 
federal health care programs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a).”167 
Section 1320a-7(a) provided that conviction for the charged violations 
would result in exclusion from participation in all federal health care 
programs.168 Excluding a pharmaceutical and medical device company like 
J&J from Medicare, Medicaid, and all federal programs would have a 
catastrophic effect on the company, and might even give cause to fear for 
future viability.169 
The agreement also stated: “J&J had a pre-existing compliance and 
ethics program that was effective and the majority of problematic 
operations globally resulted from insufficient implementation of the J&J 
compliance and ethics program in acquired companies.”170 
2. The Expressive Problem: An Effective Compliance Program 
and the Use of Criminal Law to Penalize Negligence 
What expression was made through this prosecution of J&J?171 One 
positive expression is that FCPA violations will be aggressively investigated 
and prosecuted. The Statement of Facts included in the agreement 
describes real and persistent corruption. Over a period of eight years in 
Greece, DePuy paid over $16 million to agents, “knowing that a significant 
portion was used to pay cash incentives to publicly-employed Greek 
[healthcare providers] to induce the purchase of DePuy products.”172 
Equally troubling, senior executives at DePuy ordered changes to the way 
payments were made in an effort to cover up what they knew to be 
wrongful conduct.173 Other subsidiaries made additional illegal payments.174 
 
 167. Id. ¶ 4.j. 
 168. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (2012). 
 169. See, e.g., Dan Levine, Health Giant to Plead Case in D.C., The Recorder, Dec. 3, 2009, at 1 
(“A felony conviction against Johnson & Johnson would lead to a big fine, but it would have 
enormous consequences beyond that. Under federal regulations, it would mean automatic exclusion 
from Medicare and Medicaid, which would be catastrophic for the company and would also deny 
millions of patients the range of drugs it offers.”); see also John Ashcroft et al., Whistleblowers Cash in, 
Unwary Corporations Pay, 40 Hofstra L. Rev. 367, 374 (2011) (“[D]ebarment in federal programs 
[can be a] corporate life-threatening event for firms with a high percentage of government business 
such as defense contractors, medical device manufacturers, and pharmaceutical companies . . . .”). 
 170. Johnson & Johnson DPA, supra note 159, ¶ 4.k.v. 
 171. In this Subpart, I am considering exclusively the prosecution of the parent company, Johnson 
& Johnson. The prosecution of DePuy, the subsidiary of J&J, does not present the same issues. 
 172. Johnson & Johnson DPA, supra note 159, at Attach. A ¶ 71. 
 173. See id. at Attach. A ¶ 40 (describing an email from the Vice President of Finance to another 
senior executive recommending methods of payment that would “pass the red face test”); see also id. 
at Attach A. ¶ 45 (describing an email from the Vice President of Finance admonishing participants in 
the payment scheme for creating a written record of cash incentives “which cannot be mentioned in 
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That this conduct was investigated and prosecuted criminally at all 
expresses a commitment to exposing and punishing foreign bribery. 
There are, however, a few other expressions that people might take 
from the prosecution. Although the wrongful conduct occurred almost 
exclusively within subsidiaries owned by J&J,175 J&J itself was also 
prosecuted.176 The prosecution threatened J&J not merely with the 
possibility of a conviction, but with the potentially existential threat of 
exclusion from federal healthcare programs.177 Moreover, the DOJ 
conceded that J&J had a pre-existing and effective compliance program.178 
There is, therefore, an expression that while an effective compliance 
program can mitigate loss, it will not prevent prosecution. 
More broadly, in light of the effective compliance program and the 
general lack of involvement by J&J employees outside of the named 
subsidiaries, there is an expression—similar to that criticized in the AML 
prosecution179—that prosecutions are not tied to relative culpability. 
Some corporations will have strong, positive, ethical cultures that 
influence individual agents favorably, like Corporation Alpha.180 Others 
will lack this culture, or even promote a negative culture (for instance, 
favoring short-term gains at any cost) and influence individual agents 
negatively, like Corporation Beta.181 But an individual corporate agent 
might violate the law at either type of corporation. Malfeasance is less 
likely at the corporation with a strong, positive culture, but cultures are 
merely influences: they do not define or circumscribe behavior. 
J&J, according to the agreement and accompanying Statement of 
Facts, is more like the hypothetical Corporation Alpha than Corporation 
Beta:182 For the most part the corporation worked as society wants 
corporations to work,183 but things went wrong anyway. 
J&J did agree that “the majority of the problematic operations 
globally resulted from insufficient implementation of the J&J compliance 
 
written correspondence with DePuy International”). 
 174. See Johnson & Johnson DPA, supra note 159, at Attach. A ¶¶ 72–119. 
 175. After DePuy was acquired by J&J, the “senior executive in charge of DePuy at the time” 
became a senior executive at J&J, but he retained control of DePuy. Id. at Attach. A ¶ 17. There is no 
allegation that any other J&J personnel were involved in the wrongdoing. Indeed, in the one identified 
instance in which a J&J employee other than the DePuy executive learned of problematic conduct by 
an agent, the relationship with the agent was terminated within two months. Id. at Attach. A ¶¶ 31–32. 
 176. See id. ¶¶ 1, 6.d, 11. 
 177. See supra text accompanying notes 167–169. 
 178. Johnson & Johnson DPA, supra note 159, ¶ 4.k.v. 
 179. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 180. See supra text accompanying notes 144–147. 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 144–147. 
 182. See supra text accompanying note 144. 
 183. This is evidenced by DOJ’s concession that J&J had a pre-existing compliance program that 
was effective. Johnson & Johnson DPA, supra note 159, ¶ 4.k.v. 
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and ethics program in acquired companies,” and that this failure rests 
squarely with J&J.184 Still, J&J’s failure to sufficiently implement a 
compliance program in every new acquisition across a global company is 
quite different from—and less serious than—failures such as maintaining a 
culture that facilitated the wrongdoing or involvement of senior personnel 
in the wrongdoing. Failure to fully implement a compliance program 
quickly enough to prevent harm might merit condemnation if there was an 
indication that the compliance program was not fully implemented 
because the parent company knew that doing so would undermine the 
(illicit) profitability of subsidiaries. There is no allegation to that effect in 
J&J’s case. Rather, the gist of the agreement is that J&J was a generally 
good corporate citizen that negligently failed to properly control a few of 
its subsidiaries. It may make sense to penalize J&J for that negligence; it 
makes less sense to bring the opprobrium of criminal justice upon the 
company.185 
The expression of condemnation inherent in criminal liability is 
inconsistent with the position that this was an accident of oversight. Failure 
of oversight is negligent, and there are good reasons to penalize it; but 
invoking the expressively distinctive criminal law to do so risks the 
expressive dissonance that can undermine legitimacy or the evisceration 
of expression in criminal law that can undermine efficacy.186 
Here, it is worth noting a limitation to my conclusion. One might 
ask why we cannot sufficiently condemn a company for negligence such 
that criminal liability is expressively appropriate. The resolution of that 
issue is related to my conclusions: If criminal sanctions ought only apply 
where there is a basis to condemn the defendant, whether there is a basis 
to condemn the defendant for mere negligence will determine whether 
criminal sanctions ought to apply in instances of mere negligence. I have 
largely assumed that corporations ought not to be subjected to criminal 
liability for mere negligence.187 As noted above, I have intentionally side-
stepped the issue of whether criminal liability is ever appropriate in cases 
of mere negligence (that is, a single instance of negligence).188 I did so for 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. See supra note 138. 
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 152–157. 
 187. By “mere negligence” I am speaking about criminal acts so attenuated from the corporation 
as a whole that to attribute them to the corporation doesn’t quite “fit.” This analysis, admittedly, 
involves a sort of personification of the corporation and attribution of mental states that, of course, are 
not actually applicable. Corporations qua corporations cannot really be said to be unreasonably 
unaware of an unjustifiable risk because corporations qua corporations lack awareness. Indeed, the 
DePuy personnel who authorized and paid bribes were agents of J&J. Accordingly, their knowledge 
might be attributed to J&J, and one might say J&J was actually aware of the wrongdoing. But this 
analysis begs the question; after all, whether we attribute that knowledge to J&J turns on whether we 
think J&J ought to be responsible. 
 188. See supra note 138. 
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two reasons: First, as a theoretical matter, this is a challenging question 
that merits its own article. Second, in most cases, negligence nets less 
condemnation than more direct wrongdoing—that is, there is generally a 
difference in the degree of condemnation for negligence and that for more 
direct misconduct. To apply criminal liability to corporate shortcomings 
like the failure to conduct diligence beyond that normally due risks 
diluting the expressive power of criminal sanctions.189 On the other hand, 
whereas a single act of negligence does not elicit the degree of opprobrium 
typically associated with criminal sanctions, a pattern of negligence might. 
Patterns of negligence that can be attributed to a corporate culture, 
however, do not qualify as “mere negligence,” and may be the basis for 
criminal liability.190 
3. Another Possible Expressive Problem: DPA and the 
Appearance of Coercion 
Another concern about the J&J resolution is that it generates the 
appearance of coercion. After all, J&J agreed to pay approximately 
$21 million in civil penalties and to accept monitoring after being 
threatened with potentially company-jeopardizing exclusion from 
government programs.191 For some companies, just the prospect of 
indictment is a significant threat. The indictment itself can have a dramatic 
impact on share price192 or even the ability of the corporation to continue 
business as usual.193 For J&J, the possibility of being excluded from 
federal health care programs is an additional threat of even greater 
magnitude. Threats like these—especially where they are memorialized 
in the settlement agreement—could suggest the resolution was 
effectively coerced.194 
 
 189. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1877 (“[O]veruse [of criminal law] will impair the criminal law’s 
nondeterrent functions . . . .”). 
 190. See infra Part IV. 
 191. Johnson & Johnson DPA, supra note 159, ¶¶ 6, 11.  
 192. See Rapp, supra note 2, at 119–20 (noting that news of corporate fraud may result in a 
decrease in stock price “completely out of proportion to the ‘fundamental news’ that a disclosure 
conveys”); see also Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 159, 160 n.7 (2008) (“For public companies, 
the share price is usually immediately affected [upon an indictment becoming public].”). 
 193. See Interview with David Pitofsky, Partner, Goodwin Procter LLP, New York, New York, Corp. 
Crime Rep., Nov. 28, 2005 (“It may be that the market responds differently to criminal investigations and 
convictions than it used to, but upon the announcement of a criminal investigation, companies regularly 
lose half of their market value. If the price remains depressed long enough, the capital markets dry up, the 
ability to hire quality people dries up. The company’s oxygen supply is cut off.”). 
 194. See Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking 
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 53, 86–87 (2007) (“[S]o long as 
there is a hint of criminality by even a single lowly employee, the corporation’s counsel has no 
leverage and no bargaining power. Only the prosecutor can be merciful, and for his mercy the 
corporation rationally chooses to cooperate in any way demanded.”); Andrew Weissman & David 
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A coercive process, even without looking to the substance of 
allegations and resolution, would cause observers to question the fairness 
of the outcome,195 simply because the process would suggest the outcome 
had more to do with risk assessment and risk tolerance that it did with 
the underlying fact of guilt or innocence.196 Were the process to appear 
coercive, the damage to the legitimacy and expressive efficacy of the 
legal system would be severe. 
C. The Variable Significance of Expressive Concerns 
The prosecutions of AML and J&J demonstrate at least two kinds 
of potential negative expression. There is the appearance of unfairness 
where criminal liability is applied to a non-blameworthy entity; both 
AML and J&J generate this problem to some degree. Additionally, J&J 
demonstrates the risks of more straightforward procedural unfairness. 
The appearance of a coerced resolution is incompatible with a fair process. 
In this Subpart, I suggest that the former is a far more serious problem in 
corporate prosecutions than the latter. While coerced resolutions would 
have an even more detrimental effect on legitimacy and expressive efficacy 
than blaming the non-blameworthy, there is less reason to worry about 
coercion in corporate prosecutions than about misapplication of criminal 
liability. 
The coercion point can be overstated when it comes to corporations.197 
Corporations do fear indictment, but they do not simply roll over at the 
mention of possible criminal penalties.198 It is not the case that corporations 
never proceed to trial: They do.199 
 
Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 Ind. L.J. 411, 426 (2007) (“[A] corporation has 
little choice but to accede to the government’s demands.”). 
 195. Tyler, supra note 30, at 164. This is a particularly interesting factor in that it is a sort of hybrid 
between the substantive, outcome-based norms and the procedural-based norms. Still, “[f]air 
outcomes are one thing that people expect from a fair procedure, and a procedure that consistently 
produces unfair outcomes will eventually be viewed as unfair itself.” Id. 
 196. See Ellen S. Podgor, White-Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game, 
85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 77, 77–78 (2010) (“[O]ur existing legal system places the risk of going to trial, 
and in some cases even being charged with a crime, so high, that innocence and guilt no longer become 
the real considerations.”). 
 197. Indeed, Sara Sun Beale aptly points out that coercive process is hardly unique to corporate 
prosecutions, and may even be a more significant problem in other kinds of cases. Beale, supra note 
148, at 1523–29. I have previously addressed the risks of coercion in non-corporate cases. See Gregory 
M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 143 (2011). 
 198. As Peter Henning writes: 
The demise of Arthur Andersen after its conviction in 2002 for obstruction of justice is often 
used to “prove” the purported overwhelming power of prosecutors and the trembling fear 
of corporations who dare not risk going to trial under any circumstances lest they face near-
certain destruction. However, there have been no other instances of a large firm suffering 
the same fate since then, even though other companies that have been charged with crimes 
and appear to have survived the ordeal, albeit quite a bit worse for wear. 
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Prosecutors wield significant power negotiating the resolution of 
corporate criminal prosecutions, but a brief review of Siemens’ resolution 
of a multi-year investigation of foreign bribery suggests corporations are 
hardly helpless. The Siemens example is good because the wrongdoing was 
extensive and well established.200 If companies ever lack the ability to 
negotiate, Siemens during its FCPA investigation would be a decent 
example. 
But here is what happened: In 2008, the DOJ announced that it had 
resolved its investigation of Siemens for violations of the FCPA with “the 
largest monetary sanction ever imposed in an FCPA case since the act was 
passed by Congress in 1977.”201 Siemens incurred fines to the DOJ, the 
Securities Exchange Commission and German authorities totaling about 
$1.6 billion.202 This is a very large sum, of course, but it was imposed to 
penalize a “pattern of bribery . . . unprecedented in scale and geographic 
reach . . . . involv[ing] more than $1.4 billion in bribes to government 
officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the Americas.”203 
Because these bribes affected “thousands of contracts over many years,” 
the DOJ conceded it could not calculate the amount Siemens profited 
from the bribes.204 
For purposes of applying the sentencing guidelines, the government 
and Siemens agreed on an estimated loss amount of $805.5 million.205 But 
this is surely a woefully inadequate figure. Siemens paid over $1.4 billion 
in bribes that affected thousands of contracts. It is inconceivable Siemens 
engaged in the largest bribery scheme ever detected because it lost 
money doing so. If Siemens paid $1.4 billion in bribes, it is almost certain 
Siemens earned more than $1.4 billion in contracts as a result. Moreover, 
unless there was an exceedingly low profit margin on the bribes, Siemens 
earned more than $1.6 billion, the total amount it was fined, as a result of 
its crimes. Yet the total benefits of bribery likely exceed even these direct 
benefits. For example, the benefit of earning a single contract can extend 
far beyond the value of the contract simply by establishing relationships, 
 
Henning, supra note 11, at 1418–19. 
 199. Id. at 1419 (citing, by way of example, W.R. Grace & Co. taking an environmental case to 
trial and winning). 
 200. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines 
(Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html (“Today’s filings make 
clear that for much of its operations across the globe, bribery was nothing less than standard operating 
procedure for Siemens . . . .”). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Department’s Sentencing Memorandum at 13, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaf, 
(D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/siemens-sentencing-memo.pdf. 
 205. Id. 
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trust, and goodwill that can influence future contracts. Barring an 
inconceivably ill-managed and self-defeating course of conduct, Siemens’ 
crime—even after accounting for the largest fine in the history of FCPA 
enforcement—almost surely paid.206 That it did so is a tribute, at least in 
part, to Siemens’ ability to negotiate, notwithstanding the credible threat 
of indictment wielded by prosecutors.207 
The appearance of coercion is always a concern, and it raises real 
risks of undermining legitimacy that vary dramatically from basic norms 
about procedural fairness.208 However, there are probably more reasons to 
worry about the appearance of coercion with prosecutions of individuals 
than of corporations.209 As Beale argues, individual defendants—who 
waive all trial rights and plead guilty at a rate greater than 95%, face 
additional risks such as mandatory minimum sentences, might lack the 
resources to hire retained counsel, and are often incarcerated pre-trial—
present at least as great (and almost certainly more troubling) an 
appearance of coercion than does a major corporation resolving a criminal 
investigation through a civil fine.210 
Even if one concludes there is some appearance of coercion in the 
way criminal investigations are resolved, not every expressive cost can be 
eliminated. The resolution of criminal investigations through civil fines is 
an example of a legal action with some expressive cost that is, all things 
considered, worth the cost. Consider the alternatives. Putting aside the 
constitutional concerns with requiring prosecutors to pursue criminal 
resolution to criminal investigations,211 the outcome would be impractical 
 
 206. Mark Mendelsohn, then-Deputy Fraud Section Chief, has argued against this claim citing to 
collateral consequences such as the cost of the investigation, a $100 million World Bank fine, and the 
expense of replacing its board of directors. See Skip Kaltenheuser, Anti-Corruption—US Leads the 
Way, Int’l Bar News (Feb. 2010), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=21F61C45-
0318-41F6-89F8-3E8C01EC57B1. This argument strikes me as unpersuasive both because it still fails 
to identify enough additional costs to make clear that Siemens’ conduct did not benefit the company in 
the long run, and also because the costs of defense and remedial actions are never considered part of 
the punishment in other contexts. 
 207. Mike Koehler suggests another factor that likely added to Siemens’ leverage: 
Siemens is a major U.S. government contractor and its diverse business units have contracts 
with a wide range of U.S. government agencies, including Department of Defense, 
Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Department of Transportation, 
Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Energy, Department of 
Commerce, Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the General Services 
Administration. The DOJ stated specifically in its sentencing memorandum that it chose to 
resolve the Siemens matter the way it did to avoid “collateral consequences” that could 
have resulted from criminal FCPA anti-bribery charges including the “risk of debarment 
and exclusion from government contracts.” 
Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 Geo. J. Int’l. L. 907, 996 (2010) (footnote omitted). 
 208. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 209. See Podgor, supra note 196 (giving examples of individuals charged with white collar crimes). 
 210. Beale, supra note 148, at 1525–29. 
 211. See Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that 
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and undesirable. Under such a rule, a prosecutor would be required, 
upon investigating a company for potential criminal wrongdoing, to 
resolve the matter either with a declination or a prosecution. This would 
result in less deterrence of wrongful conduct, if only because of the 
resource restraints on proceeding to trial on every matter. Similarly, any 
rule forbidding prosecutors from mentioning the possibility of debarment 
or exclusion would be inconsequential, at best. If there is a risk of 
debarment or exclusion, it is in the company’s interest to know that and, 
in all but the most outlandish cases, the company will know that. That is 
why corporations employ lawyers. Accordingly, to the extent that the 
possibility of exclusion or debarment drives a settlement, it would do so 
whether or not the prosecutor mentioned it. 
Therefore, on the one hand, although there may be some expressive 
cost to the way in which settlements are negotiated—as suggested by the 
J&J prosecution—the cost is highly susceptible to being overstated, and 
the possible remedies appear even less desirable. On the other hand, the 
cost of imposing criminal liability absent blameworthiness, as in cases of 
mere respondeat superior liability, generates a rather plain expressive 
cost and little benefit that could not as well be achieved by other means 
without the expressive cost. In Part IV, I address revisions to the corporate 
liability standard that could fix this problem. First, however, I consider a 
possible objection to the reality of expressive costs. 
III.  Do People Really Notice? 
How many people are really aware of the way in which the J&J 
settlement was secured? How many people even know whether it is a 
criminal or civil resolution? How many people care? 
The answer is, probably not many. 
So does any of this matter? If people don’t know about the details of 
these prosecutions, does it matter how they are secured? 
People observe legal actions as expressions by the legal system. 
Punishment without basis for condemnation generates an expressive 
dissonance (that is, the legal system is expressing condemnation while the 
observer sees no basis to condemn). This dissonance must be resolved, and 
the resolution entails either harm to the legitimacy of the legal system or 
harm to the expressive efficacy of criminal law.  
But if there is no observer, then none of this matters. Unseen legal 
actions have no functional expression. 
Still, it does matter how these prosecutions are carried out. It is true 
that with any one prosecution, few people will be aware of the sort of 
details that would be likely to influence perceptions about the legitimacy 
 
the decision to investigate or prosecute an offense rests with the prosecutor). 
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of the process. However, the fact that the audience is small should not give 
leave to ignore basic principles of fairness altogether. Over time, 
expressively negative conduct will have a cumulative impact on 
perceptions of the legal system. Perhaps in one case that influence applies 
to a few officers and employees of a corporation, and maybe outside 
counsel and a few family members, but in the sum of cases even this 
limited awareness of negative expression in the legal system will grow. 
This does-it-really-matter question raises a related issue: How big of 
a problem is the expressive dissonance in corporate prosecutions? Beale 
argues that the disconnect between the perception of blameworthiness 
and the application of criminal law is not unique to corporate criminal 
liability; rather, it is endemic to our legal system.212 For example, in many 
jurisdictions the limited scope of the insanity defense will permit 
convictions of defendants in cases where all parties agree the defendant 
lacked the capacity to control his conduct as result of mental disease.213 
She also gives the examples of accomplice liability and strict- or near-
strict-liability weapons and immigration offenses as cases where criminal 
law applies notwithstanding the absence of a reason to condemn.214 
Beale is plainly correct that the problem of expressive dissonance is 
not unique to corporate criminal law—it exists elsewhere. She further 
concludes that, given the relative paucity of corporate prosecutions and the 
less severe consequences faced by convicted corporations when compared 
to individuals, flaws in the corporate criminal law present less urgency than 
the issues of insanity, accomplice liability, and strict liability or status 
offenses.215 
I am sympathetic to this assessment, and yet maintain that corporate 
criminal liability presents an especially significant expressive problem 
because of the role of corporations in our society and legal system. Marc 
Galanter presents a compelling overview of the expanding role of 
corporations in society.216 He marshals evidence that the corporate sphere 
has grown, the legal sphere has grown, and the corporate influence over 
 
 212. Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 1482, 1488 (2009). 
 213. Id. at 1488–89. This is particularly interesting in light of Michael Moore’s work identifying 
necessary capacities for desert through application of the insanity defense. See Moore, supra note 65, 
at 595. Moore’s approach, which strikes me as a good one, is to take the insanity defense as a baseline 
for lacking desert, and from that identify the capacities the insane lack that are necessary for desert. 
Id.; see also Gilchrist, supra note 19, pt. II.B.1; Beale’s observation suggests that while insanity may 
remain a fair baseline for lack of desert, the absence of legal insanity—even without another excuse—
does not imply desert. 
 214. Beale, supra note 212, at 1489. 
 215. Id. at 1490 (“[I]f we have to triage, and give priority to only a few of these issues, neither the 
number of cases nor the severity of the sanctions would place corporate criminal liability at the top of 
my list for reform.”). 
 216. Galanter, supra note 21, at 1375–87. 
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the legal sphere has also grown.217 Corporations consume ever-increasing 
legal resources and, as frequent and repeat participants in legal actions, 
corporations play a significant role defining the substance of the law.218 
This importance of corporations to our legal system is difficult to 
overstate. Legal expressions in corporate prosecutions may, therefore, 
generate disproportionate impact compared to legal expressions in 
individual prosecutions. To be sure, this is not always the case. 
Furthermore, Beale’s point about the sheer numbers remains correct—
there is simply a lot more expression through prosecutions of individuals 
than through prosecution of corporations. But the expression in 
corporation prosecutions may be particularly pronounced simply because 
the outsized presence—legal, financial, and social—of the corporate 
defendant. 
There is, however, another concern about whether corporations 
deserve blame: What if there is a widespread anti-corporate sentiment that 
all corporations deserve blame, even where we cannot identify the normal 
hallmarks of blameworthiness such as culture, policies, or leadership 
involvement? If enough people sufficiently dislike corporations, would 
they not perceive a legal system that attacks corporations even absent the 
indicia of blame as more, rather than less, legitimate? Put differently, 
could a widespread and strong anti-corporate sentiment cause people to 
perceive legitimacy in condemning corporations even where there is not an 
immediate basis to do so? Perhaps there is not a good reason to blame J&J 
for something beyond negligence for the failures at the recently acquired 
DePuy, but were enough people sufficiently anti-corporate, they might see 
a basis to blame large corporations simply because they are large 
corporations. As such, the legal system that prosecutes more large 
corporations would be perceived as more legitimate, without regard for 
whether there is a reason to blame the corporation in the particular 
instance. 
While there is at least a significant minority of the population that 
holds strongly negative views of large corporations,219 I will cautiously say 
that—although I do not have empirical support for this position—I think 
the condemnation of corporations though prosecutions without regard 
for culpability would inure to the detriment of the perception of 
 
 217. Id. at 1387–98. 
 218. Id. at 1389 (“Two recent studies of federal court litigation suggest that organizational litigants 
win more frequently and lose less often than do individuals.”). In a system reliant on precedent and 
stare decisis, frequent wins amount to more favorable law.  
 219. See, e.g., Colin Moynihan, 185 Arrested on Occupy Wall St. Anniversary, N.Y. Times (Sept. 17, 
2012, 8:00 am), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/protests-near-stock-exchange-on-occupy-
wall-st-anniversary (describing the arrest of 185 people at the New York Stock Exchange during a protest 
against an “unfair economic system that benefited the rich and corporations at the expense of ordinary 
citizens”). 
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legitimacy. Criminal law exists to systemically punish wrongful conduct. 
The use of criminal law to attack the unpopular—even if said use is 
popular in the short run—is not sustainable. While indiscriminate 
prosecution of corporations might be popular in the short run during a 
time of widespread anger against corporations, it is so contrary to the 
rule of law that it would be bound, at least over time, to undermine the 
perceived legitimacy of the legal system. Mob rule might be popular, but 
it remains mob rule and unlikely to be confused with legitimate law. 
Therefore, even if there were widespread anti-corporate sentiment, and 
even if unprincipled anti-corporate prosecutions were popular, these 
corporations would be unlikely to increase the perception of legitimacy 
and would probably, over time, decrease that perception.220 
A legal system that acts to generate expressions consistent with 
widely held norms will be better functioning and more stable than one that 
does not do so. Therefore, where avoidable expressive dissonance is 
identified, it ought to be eliminated, unless the cost of doing so is too great. 
In this case, as I argue in the next Part, the remedy seems relatively simple. 
IV.  Limiting Corporate Criminal Liability 
The AML and J&J prosecutions suggest that a respondeat superior 
standard for criminal liability is too broad. In both cases, the 
corporations were subject to criminal prosecution absent a reason to 
blame the corporation qua corporation.221 People blame corporations when 
corporations, through policies, culture, or leadership, influenced the 
wrongdoing.222 To limit the costs to legitimacy and expression described 
above,223 criminal liability should attach to corporations only where 
corporate policies or culture influenced the wrongdoing. 
This proposal is not easy to implement in practice. Pamela Bucy has 
proposed a corporate ethos standard of liability, pursuant to which a 
corporation would be criminal liable only where “there exists a corporate 
ethos that encouraged the particular criminal conduct at issue.”224 This 
seems both correct and impractical. Bucy acknowledges the challenges 
posed in implementing the standard and presents a thorough defense of 
 
 220. Again, I do not have empirical support for this conclusion (hence, I offer it cautiously). While 
the conclusion makes sense to me, this might be an area for further empirical research. 
 221. As noted above, in each case there may be reason to blame the corporation for omissions 
(e.g., failure to conduct more due diligence or failure to quickly implement compliance programs after 
acquiring a company). But that is a lesser sort of blame than is typically associated with criminal 
sanctions. See supra text accompanying notes 187–190. 
 222. See Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost, supra note 19, at 9–14; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 144–179. 
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 152–155. 
 224. Bucy, supra note 148, at 1128. 
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the standard in the face of those challenges.225 Still, as Samuel Buell 
concludes, “[i]t is extremely difficult to see what trial and appellate 
review of enterprise cases would look like under such legal rules.”226 No 
one has presented a functioning model for a culture- or policy-based 
standard of corporate liability. 
A. Precluding Liability Where There Was an Effective Compliance 
Program 
A more manageable standard would be to preclude criminal liability 
for corporations that have an effective compliance program.227 Such a rule 
could be implemented by adding “an additional element to criminal 
liability that requires the prosecution to prove that a corporation lacks 
‘effective policies and procedures to deter and detect criminal actions by 
their employees.’”228 Alternatively, it could be implemented with an 
affirmative good faith defense.229 If companies were only held liable where 
it could be proven that the company lacked effective policies to prevent 
the wrongdoing, there would be a basis to blame the company. The 
expressive failures identified in this Article would be, for the most part, 
avoided. 
One potential problem with the good faith defense is that a standard 
of “effective policies and procedures” would need to be established. 
There are models for such a standard. Both the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines230 and the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual231 identify aspects of 
effective compliance programs. Section 9-28.000 of the U.S. Attorneys’ 
Manual provides guidelines for prosecution of business entities and 
includes the existence of an effective compliance program among the 
relevant factors.  
The Manual notes that “the Department recognizes that no 
compliance program can ever prevent all criminal activity by a 
corporation’s employees,” and that it “has no formulaic requirements 
regarding corporate compliance programs.”232 These are important points: 
 
 225. Id. at 1176–82. 
 226. Buell, supra note 143, at 528. 
 227. The Chamber of Commerce has been lobbying to implement such a rule in specific legislation. 
See Andrew Weissmann & Alixandra Smith, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, Restoring 
Balance: Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 11 (2010) (urging 
implementation of a compliance defense to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et 
seq.). 
 228. Brief for the Ass’n of Corporate Counsel et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant 
Urging Reversal, supra note 17, at 23 (quoting Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking 
Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 Ind. L.J. 411 (2007)). 
 229. See supra note 16. 
 230. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1 (2011). 
 231. See U.S. Attorneys’ Manual 9-28.800 (2008). 
 232. See id.  
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Efficacy in compliance will vary by industry, organizational structure, size, 
and many other factors, just as do the elements of efficacy for business 
success. Accordingly, the DOJ eschews a singular compliance formula, 
opting instead to identify factors that ought to be considered in assessing 
whether a company had an effective compliance program.233 Overarching 
considerations include “whether the program is adequately designed for 
maximum effectiveness in preventing and detecting wrongdoing by 
employees and whether corporate management is enforcing the program 
or is tacitly encouraging or pressuring employees to engage in misconduct 
to achieve business objectives.”234 More specifically, prosecutors are 
encouraged to inquire on a case-by-case basis: 
 Is the corporation’s compliance program well designed? 
 Is the program being applied earnestly and in good faith? 
 Does the corporation’s compliance program work?235 
Relevant factors include: 
[T]he comprehensiveness of the compliance program; the extent and 
pervasiveness of the criminal misconduct; the number and level of the 
corporate employees involved; the seriousness, duration, and 
frequency of the misconduct; and any remedial actions taken by the 
corporation, including, for example, disciplinary action against past 
violators uncovered by the prior compliance program, and revisions to 
corporate compliance programs in light of lessons learned.236  
Additionally, prosecutors should consider how quickly the company 
disclosed wrongdoing, the independence of directors, and the 
independence and reporting chains for auditing entities.  
 Those seeking a precisely defined standard will not be satisfied by this 
model, but as I will argue in the next Subpart, a precisely defined standard 
is not necessary. Precision of definition is at odds with the basic premise 
that compliance programs are not one-size-fits-all: An effective 
compliance program for a mid-size technology company may look very 
different than an effective compliance program for a large pharmaceutical 
company. The DOJ’s non-exhaustive list of factors is a good starting point 
for defining a standard of effective policies and procedures.  
B. Is There a Manageable Standard? 
One concern about a good faith defense is whether such a standard 
is specific enough to properly guide a jury. Bucy responds to this 
anticipated objection to her ethos proposal by noting that fuzzy legal 
 
 233. See id. 
 234. See id.  
 235. See id.  
 236. See id.  
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standards exist throughout the law.237 Fact-finders are routinely asked to 
use their judgment in applying vague standards. 
To take just one example, consider the vagueness and complexity of 
jury instructions in a trial alleging a conspiracy to fix prices in violation of 
the Sherman Act.238 In such a case, the jurors will be instructed—among 
other things—that to find the defendant guilty they must find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
First, that the conspiracy the defendant is charged with participating in 
actually existed during the time alleged in the indictment; 
  Second, that the defendant knowingly joined this conspiracy; 
  Third, that the defendant joined the conspiracy with the intent to 
unreasonably restrain competition; and 
  Fourth, that the conspiracy concerned goods or services in interstate 
(or foreign) commerce.239 
The instructions for each element, in turn, are quite complex. For 
example, regarding the first element—the existence of an agreement—
jurors will be told that the agreement itself is the crime.240 They will then 
be told that it does not matter if the agreement is carried out, or fails, or 
even is inconsistently followed.241 Indeed, even were it proven that the 
parties to the alleged agreement cheated on each other—in plain 
contradiction of the alleged terms of the alleged agreement—that does 
not mean there was no agreement.242 
None of which is incorrect as a matter of law, of course. The point is, 
how difficult must this be to parse in practice? Jurors will be expected, 
based on circumstantial evidence about meeting locations, telephone calls, 
and market conduct, to discern whether there was an actual meeting of 
minds between competitors about their intent to restrain competition. The 
complexity of this one element can then be compounded multifold by the 
introduction of a conscious parallelism instruction. Pursuant to that 
instruction, jurors will be told—again, correctly—that similarity “of 
business practices or even the fact that the defendants may have charged 
identical prices for the same goods and services does not automatically 
establish a conspiracy because such practices may be consistent with 
ordinary competitive behavior in a free and open market.”243 They will also 
 
 237. See Bucy, supra note 148, at 1178–79 (offering the example of the difficulty of identifying 
mens rea from necessarily circumstantial evidence). 
 238. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 239. 3 Leonard B. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions—Criminal 58-68 (2010) 
(Instruction 58-44). 
 240. Id. at 58-70 (Instruction 58-45). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 58-79 (Instruction 58-49) (emphasis added). 
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be told that this “is true even if they did so knowing that others were 
following similar practices.”244 
As a result, there could be a price fixing case in which jurors are 
entrusted to discern, on the basis of circumstantial evidence, whether two 
competitors consciously agreed to fix prices (illegal), or whether they each, 
independently and rationally, learned each other’s prices and, 
independently and rationally, set their own prices at the same level (legal). 
The epistemological challenge here is daunting. Indeed, it is so daunting 
that I fear this example demonstrates that sometimes we ask juries to do 
too much. But the fact remains that, compared to the challenge of 
discerning whether two people agreed or instead acted independently as 
you would expect them to act as business persons—where those two things 
can look identical—the challenge of evaluating the efficacy of a 
compliance program is not really so great.  
Jury instructions could reflect a flexible standard like that set forth in 
the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual.245 Jurors should be asked to consider the 
efficacy of the program as a whole. Instructions should explain that no 
compliance program is perfect and that the mere fact that a violation 
occurs does not mean that a compliance program is not effective. 
Instructions should also point out that the structure of effective 
compliance programs varies by company, industry, and other factors. 
Finally, instructions could identify, in general terms, a list of factors that 
should be considered in evaluating compliance programs. To the extent 
that the assessment of a compliance program raises questions about 
industry standards and best practices, these issues are routinely 
presented to juries through expert testimony. Under these conditions, a 
finder of fact—as well as a federal prosecutor—should be able to assess a 
compliance program. 
C. The Risk of Incentivizing Cosmetic Compliance 
Another concern is the prospect of promoting “cosmetic 
compliance.”246 Kimberly Krawiec has drawn attention to this issue.247 
Structuring, managing, and auditing compliance programs is a massive 
industry,248 and yet the empirical data do not support the efficacy of these 
programs.249 Giving corporations a complete defense for having a 
 
 244. Id. (emphasis added). 
 245. See supra Part IV.A. 
 246. See generally Krawiec, supra note 143. 
 247. See generally id. 
 248. Id. at 488 (“[T]he ethics and compliance consulting business—already a multi-billion dollar 
industry—has seen a surge in demand.”). 
 249. Id. at 490 n.11 (“[T]he poor empirical showing of internal compliance structures as a means of 
deterring organizational misconduct should cause more skepticism than evidenced in the legal and 
management literature”). On the other hand, Miriam Baer suggests that the “sheer size of the 
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particular type of program risks the inefficiency of bolstering demand for 
legally prophylactic but otherwise ineffective compliance programs, 
without an accompanying reduction in criminality.250 It also risks under-
deterring corporate crime by shielding criminal conduct from prosecution 
so long as there is a “window-dressing” of compliance efforts, however 
ineffectual.251 
These risks seem both real and largely avoidable so long as we are 
willing to entrust juries to discern between cosmetic programs and 
effective programs. Jurors could be instructed, for example, that there is 
no single ideal compliance program, and that the question for the jurors is 
whether the corporation’s program was an effective one. Given that by the 
time jurors are considering this question they would have already found a 
violation of criminal law by an agent of the corporation, the jurors would 
also need to be instructed that efficacy is not the same as capability of 
preventing all wrongdoing. An effective compliance program may 
nonetheless fail in some instances; indeed, no system is failsafe. The jury’s 
job would be to determine whether the corporation’s compliance program 
was implemented in good faith, whether it was structured adequately, 
given the risks faced by the corporation, and whether its existence should 
absolve the corporation of the wrongdoing committed by its employees. 
To address Krawiec’s concern, the jury should also be instructed expressly 
that having spent a lot of money on establishing a compliance program 
does not mean it is an effective program and that a strong paper program 
that is not adequately funded, implemented, or respected by corporate 
policies and leadership is not an effective compliance program. 
None of this suggests that discerning between an effective program 
and a cosmetic program would be easy for jurors, but it does not seem 
more difficult than many tasks we regularly entrust to jurors. 
D.  The Likely Effects of an Effective Compliance Program 
Standard 
Federal prosecutors are already instructed to take into account 
whether a company has an effective compliance program in determining 
whether to charge the corporation, but they are also expressly instructed 
that “the existence of a compliance program is not sufficient, in and of 
itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal misconduct 
 
compliance industry, which includes multiple American Lawyer 100 firms who proudly trumpet their 
assistance on their websites, severely undercuts the notion that corporations and compliance providers 
are engaged in a concerted, bad-faith attempt at intentional window-dressing.” Miriam Hechler Baer, 
Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 949, 952 (2009). 
 250. See generally Krawiec, supra note 143. 
 251. Id. at 491 (“[A] growing body of evidence indicates that internal compliance structures do not 
deter prohibited conduct within firms, and may largely serve a window-dressing function that provides 
both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability.”). 
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undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or agents.”252 So the first 
effect of establishing a complete defense based on an effective compliance 
program would be to allow the mere existence of an effective compliance 
program to preclude liability. The second effect would be to shift the role 
of assessing the compliance program from the prosecutor to the jury. This 
latter effect is the most important. 
The standard for corporate criminal liability remains respondeat 
superior.253 Accordingly, “a corporation may be held criminally responsible 
for [criminal] violations committed by its employees if they were acting 
within the scope of their authority, or apparent authority, and for the 
benefit of the corporation, even if . . . such acts were against corporate 
policy or express instructions.”254 A prosecutor will consider the efficacy of 
a compliance program in deciding whether to charge a corporation, but 
once the corporation is charged, the compliance program becomes 
irrelevant to the question of guilt. 
Jurors, being asked whether the corporation is guilty of the crime 
charged, should be asked to assess whether there is a basis to blame the 
corporation qua corporation. One way to do this would be to ask the jurors 
to make findings about whether the corporate culture or a particular policy 
induced the wrongful conduct.255 While in the abstract this is a promising 
idea, I have difficulty seeing how it would work in practice. On the other 
hand, a corporation that has a truly effective compliance program will 
generally have a culture that dissuades criminal conduct, and jurors could 
be asked to assess the efficacy of the compliance problem according to 
standards like those in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual. The overlap may not 
be perfect, but a truly effective compliance program will be part of the 
corporate culture, and the fact that it is effective means it will, more often 
than not, inform employees faced with difficult decisions. 
We should want jurors to consider the efficacy of a corporate 
compliance program, because doing so will significantly align with 
questions about whether there is a reason to blame the corporation for the 
wrongful conduct. Moving questions about the efficacy of compliance 
efforts to the jury would—to some degree—realign corporate criminal 
 
 252. U.S. Attorneys’ Manual 9-28.800 (2008). 
 253. One might propose that instead of creating a good faith defense, we should add an element 
that the prosecution must establish the absence of an effective compliance program. This is only a 
small distinction, as its impact is really just to shift the burden of proof. However, a good faith defense 
would seem to be the better option, because adding an element requires the prosecution to prove a 
negative at the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, and also because the defendant corporation 
has the best access to the information about its good faith efforts and/or compliance program. 
 254. United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983). 
 255. See Bucy, supra note 148, at 1128. 
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liability with the expression of condemnation that ought to accompany 
criminal sanctions.256 
The other obvious impact of precluding liability where there is an 
effective compliance program would be the reduction in the number of 
corporate criminal prosecutions. The new standard would make 
convictions harder to secure; corporations would have less incentive to 
accept negotiated resolutions where they had a strong compliance defense; 
prosecutors would need to marshal resources to those cases they felt they 
could prove beyond a reasonable doubt. There is nothing wrong with this, 
unless it leads to under-enforcement, which it need not do. 
As discussed above, there was probably good reason to penalize 
AML and J&J for the wrongdoing, even if those corporations were not 
themselves blameworthy.257 Each corporation was in the best position to 
avoid the wrongful conduct and failed to do so. AML should have better 
vetted or supervised Partucci. J&J should have better or more quickly 
implemented its compliance programs when it acquired DePuy. Such 
failures may not merit the condemnation of criminal sanctions, but they 
ought to be corrected. Civil penalties—which might look very similar if 
not identical to the penalties secured through criminal prosecution—
ought to be imposed. The difference would be the civil penalties would 
not purport to be criminal. They would not carry the assertion that their 
imposition merits opprobrium. Therefore, by avoiding that expression of 
condemnation in cases where there is no basis for condemnation, civil 
penalties would avoid the expressive dissonance that undermines 
legitimacy and dilutes expressive efficacy. 
Conclusion 
Where the law deviates too far from strongly held norms, it risks 
generating expressions at odds with those norms. This creates a dissonance 
between personal morality and legal commands. Where the dissonance is 
too great, one of two things must happen: the law will be perceived as less 
legitimate, or violation of the law will cease to be perceived as a basis for 
condemnation, eroding the distinctive expression associated with criminal 
liability. Either resolution undermines the legitimacy of the law, the 
persistence of the internal view, and eventually, the stability of the legal 
system. Expressive problems are of real concern, and my hope is that the 
expressive model that I have begun to develop in this Article will help 
evaluate other rules and legal actions beyond corporate prosecutions. 
 
 256. The limitation “to some degree” is important. This change would do nothing about 
substantive questions regarding what types of wrongdoing and harm are appropriately dealt with 
through criminal law. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1877. But the types of expressive failures identified 
in the AML and J&J examples above would be addressed by this change. 
 257. See supra text accompanying notes 155, 184–185. 
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People blame corporations when there is a reason to do so. But the 
legal standard for holding corporations criminally liable is too broad in 
that it can apply criminal liability even where there is no basis to condemn 
the entity. This application of criminal punishment without a basis for 
condemnation generates expressive dissonance: The legal system is 
applying condemnation when there is no basis for condemnation. The call 
for abandoning the respondeat superior standard of liability is a good one 
that can best be achieved by implementing a good faith defense. It is not 
without problems, but the challenges are surmountable and the benefits 
are worth it. 
John Coffee once suggested that “society’s capacity to focus censure 
and blame is among its scarcest resources.”258 To watch the news today is 
to question this assertion: There seems to be more than enough blame to 
go around. But Coffee’s point is right. Criminal law is not about blaming 
in the way cable television is; it is about a measured and methodical 
process by which blame is focused. Preserving the expressive function of 
criminal law is important for the criminal law, it is important for the 
perceived legitimacy and continued stability of the legal system, and it is 
important for a well-functioning society generally. 
 
 258. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1877. 
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